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ABSTRACT
De-identification methods have helped government organizations provide the public with
useful information—promoting transparency and accountability while also protecting the
individual privacy of the data subjects. However, due to the recent massive increase in data
collection and improved methods of analysis, de-identification has become a more difficult
task. This work outlines challenges and discusses procedures for making a potentially
sensitive data set available to extramural researchers and institutions without significant
risk to human subject privacy. We provide a detailed explanation of personally identifiable
information to help us understand what forms of personally identifiable information can
cause the most harm. Furthermore, we discuss the legality and ethics behind working
with personally identifiable information to illustrate the importance of protecting privacy.
We then offer a taxonomy of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts and describe how these
determine risk. Based on this taxonomy, we develop a framework to assess risk on the
Real Data Corpus, a collection of forensic disk images containing personally identifiable
information. In addition, we analyze de-identification methods such as pseudonymization
and anonymization, and consider re-identification risks. Finally, we apply our framework
and methodology to a real-world scenario to determine the risk of data disclosure to an
extramural researcher.
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Digital forensic tools and methodologies can help organizations understand criminal or
other adversarial activity through analysis of digital media. Attribution is a fundamental
prerequisite of our justice system; it maintains accountability by leading to punishment of
those responsible for adverse effects and deterring others from similar actions. Understand-
ing how an adverse effect occurred gives an organization the opportunity to protect itself
and can offer insight into potential vulnerabilities.
Research in digital forensics supports these crucial capabilities in light of an ever growing
array of challenges facing forensic analysts, ranging from increasing complexity of systems
to increase in the volume of casework and total data requiring analysis. However, the
digital forensic researcher faces a separate set of equally formidable challenges. As the
quantity of available data increases, digital forensic tools and methodologies have become
increasingly complex, challenging computer science (CS) researchers to come up with
tools and processes to protect both organizations and individuals. The risks involved with
information systems have increased with the advent of data center-scale systems and data
sets that grow rapidly in terms of complexity, variety, and size. Legacy computational
methods are outdated, and researchers now need new methods that address big data.
Adversaries present threats to several different types of CS researchers. While information
security professionals are tasked with protecting personally identifiable information (PII) of
data subjects in information systems, adversaries often exploit the PII of human data subjects
that reside in information systems for profit, creating an almost symbiotic relationship where
the pursuit of one leads to the function of another. That relationship grows constantly in
terms of complexity, as adversaries come up with new and better ways to access and exploit
PII. PII presents huge problems for other CS researchers who are constrained by ethical
concerns for data subject safety. Collecting and working with PII comes with its own
inherent risk to individual privacy. Many digital forensic researchers are not interested
1
in the identity of data subjects, but the mere fact that PII is embedded within data sets
precludes them from using or sharing of data sets, a limitation that can impede efforts to
demonstrate repeatable results.
For many decades, in order to protect against exploitation of information by adversaries,
various de-identification methods have provided human data subjects with anonymity, es-
pecially in the areas of health and government. It would not be beneficial to simply keep
research data absolutely private, were it even possible, as public or third-party disclosures
serve the scientific research community, allowing researchers to share results and test the
accuracy and efficacy of methods. Disclosures can also provide a public service; for
example, information from the U.S. Census, allows policy makers to check the state of
its citizens and determines correct congressional representation of constituents. Results
from clinical trial research regulated by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA), provides
the public with health and safety information. However, due to what Professor Latanya
Sweeney of Harvard’s Data Privacy Lab calls the “data-rich network," reverse engineering
of de-identification methods can now re-identify what was once thought to be anonymized
information [14]. According to the Belmont report, re-identification poses a big ethical
problem for those in the research community, who are held to a high standard, when
protecting the interests and welfare of human subjects of research [15].
With respect to the challenges presented above, the objective of our thesis is to define
the risks associated with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)’s Real Data Corpus (RDC)
and de-identified disclosure. The NPS Digital Evaluation and Exploitation (DEEP) lab
maintains a data set consisting of 65TB of disk images. NPS purchased the RDC data set
using secondary storage devices in secondhand markets outside the U.S. The RDC data
set contains PII and, due to the risk of identification, the data set is restricted from public
access. Identifying and removing PII in drive images remains an unsolved problem due
to the complexity of the content and also the heterogeneity of file types contained within
drive images. Additionally, the risk of re-identification poses another challenge to data
subject confidentiality. To illustrate the difficulty, de-identification of audio or video files,
or proprietary storage formats used by executables like hard drives, differs significantly from
text-based formats. Even with text-based formats, de-identification techniques alone may
not completely eliminate the identity of the data subject due to ever-improving correlation
capabilities that leverage big data.
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Our research takes a broad approach, establishing a basic risk management process, known
as a risk management framework (RMF), which we hope will provide a baseline understand-
ing for researchers that grows over time. In addition, we present a sample risk management
process that focuses on the impact of human subject privacy and may help define organi-
zational objectives, research goals, and effective security control measures. The thesis’s
risk management process may make PII exposure highly improbable, give a certain level
of protection to RDC subjects, and also advance the state-of-the-art in digital forensics by
providing researchers access to a rich collection of real data.
We aim to enhance state-of-the-art digital forensics research by allowing greater access to
real test data while minimizing the risk to the privacy of the data subjects. Since access to
the RDCwould allow advancements in digital forensic research, it is crucial that researchers
find ways to de-identify PII effectively to keep the identity of data subjects confidential,
while simultaneously providing availability so researchers can benefit from the data sets.
1.2 Motivation
The benefit of working with a data set obtained from real (rather than simulated) human
data subjects is that it gives a high level of real-world information, according to Garfinkel
et al. in their article “Bringing Science to Digital Forensics with Standardized Forensic
Corpora” [16]. However, the PII contained in the RDC makes sharing of it difficult and
requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, which can be time consuming and
administratively burdensome. De-identification may provide non-Department of Defense
(DOD) researchers with faster, more reproducible results but not without DOD risk of
re-identification and loss of confidentiality of its data subjects [16]. Before endeavoring
to de-identify algorithmically run results on the RDC, the risks need to be assessed and
perhaps measured in some way to minimize the chance of harm. Researchers can conduct
risk assessments to determinewhat risks are present andwhatmay be considered acceptable.
This thesis’s sample risk management process, as well as the baseline understanding of PII
implications and complexities it offers, present a start to one possible solution to PII and
the RDC.
Researchers in computer science are not usually clinical doctors nor experts on human or
civil rights law. However, the controls they implement and data management practices can
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affect people and cause harm. Our research seeks to define those potential harms and risks
so that a computer scientist can anticipate and therefore determine the necessary security
controls to mitigate such threats or vulnerabilities. The results of our research may help
a data provider to determine early on if a request by an outside researcher is feasible or
too resource intensive to be delivered. With a baseline understanding of potential real-
world effects, digital forensic researchers can complete further work with de-identification
and re-identification research using this RMF. By setting up the foundational policy and
procedures, this thesis endeavors to eliminate much of the guesswork for researchers and
reduce potential for unintentional harm for individuals and organizations.
1.3 Research Questions
Our research explores an alternative to sharing the RDC, which achieves the benefits without
the need to release full RDC content to external researchers. To implement this approach,
NPS needs a set of criteria for researchers who wish to run analytical algorithms on RDC
disk images. If the algorithms adhere to the criteria set out, NPS will create a process of
running these algorithms against the RDC and de-identifying the output before returning
the results to researchers. The hypothesis is that, if the criteria are sufficiently restrictive
(meaning that all output is required to take the form of structured text), we may reduce the
risk of PII exposure. Specific questions our thesis seeks to address follow.
• How can we allow extramural researchers access to the RDC and institutions without
significant risk to human subject privacy?
• Can we successfully de-identify PII output generated by vetted algorithms provided
by external researchers and safely disclose the results?
• At what point do results lose their utility when too much PII is removed?
• What are the risks, and what is considered acceptable risk of disclosure?
• Due to the heterogeneity of data, can we effectively build a criteria for algorithms and
how restrictive must the criteria be to protect human subject confidentiality?
1.4 Scope
The scope of this thesis investigates ways in which NPS can share the RDC data with
other academic institutions with minimal risk to human subject confidentiality. Initially,
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our research focused on de-identification of results derived from programs run on the
RDC. Although we endeavored to experiment with a few de-identification scenarios,
thorough background reading of PII classification and de-identification processes left us
searching for a more comprehensive approach. For example, re-identification attacks break
the confidentiality of de-identified PII, rendering the process useless. Although specific
experimental scenarios on this topic do provide insights, “extension neglect” [17], or scoping
a problem so narrowly by a researcher, that they neglect the complexity or relationships it
has with the bigger problem (i.e., big data), can leave anonymized data subjects vulnerable.
Understanding that disk images contain a variety of information types, file formats, and
data modalities, the diverse requests made by researchers makes de-identification of PII
not only difficult, but potentially ineffective. Since de-identification has such a wide-
ranging potential impact for both research and privacy we limited the scope of this thesis to
establishing a solid foundation of understanding legal, ethical, and other ramifications, and
presenting the results of one study.
To help facilitate sharing of RDC, we define many legal, ethical, and regulatory provisions
set by the DOD, Department of Navy (DON), or any other applicable authoritative body.
With a solid understanding of organizational requirements and context, we formulate criteria
for algorithms and security controls that would allow the RDC to be tested by outside
researchers and then perform de-identification on test run results. Our intent is to build
the beginnings of a cybersecurity and privacy risk framework that will allow NPS to share
RDC data in a way that reduces the risk of harming RDC data subjects.
1.5 Significant Findings and Contributions
Our research contributes through the following means. The research:
• Provides a basic framework to responsibly release data sets that contain personal
information (PI)
• Frames organizational objectives and other laws and regulations tied with the RDC
• Develops taxonomy of data types and access levels
• Identifies threats, vulnerabilities, impacts, and security controls of the RDC
• Suggests tools for de-identification in other data modalities.
• Provides a list of safe practices when applying various de-identification methods
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• Analyzes risk on one RDC scenario
• Establishes a procedure for how PI is processed and recommends continuous mon-
itoring or logging of various PI overtime to improve our understanding of linkage
attacks and re-identification.
1.6 Relevance and Contribution to the DOD
The approach and methods in our research can be utilized by any organization that carries
the fiduciary responsibility of managing PII and the privacy of their data subjects. The U.S.
DOD is a federal government agency and the largest employer in the world, employing 1.3
million active duty service members, 742,000 civilian personnel, 826,000 National Guard
members and Reservists, and a fluctuating number of contractors; additionally, the DOD
supports two million military retirees and their families [18]. Aside from managing such a
large number of personnel and contractors, the DOD’s domain of supervision encompasses
all military branches, national intelligence services, research and development support
centers, educational institutions, and the military health system [18]. With the tremendous
responsibility of managing PII on such scale and variety, the DOD also has a mission
to provide a level of transparency to its citizens. According to the DOD Principles of
Information, the DOD has a full commitment to “make available timely and accurate
information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand
the facts about national security and defense strategy” [19]. The DOD Principles of
Information also highlight things that could potentially threaten the U.S. or violate the
privacy of its employees and citizens [19].
As recently as 2012, the DODmade reductions to cease the pervasive use of Social Security
Numbers due to increases in identity theft [20]. Our research establishes a foundation of
understanding for DOD researchers to apply when carrying out all aspects of their mission
regarding PII and data sharing.
1.7 Thesis Structure
Our thesis structure is comprised of eight chapters. Following this introduction, the chapters
are structured as follows.
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• Chapter 2 gives background and terminology regarding digital forensics, big data,
and PII. The chapter goes on to define risk, de-identification, and methods.
• Chapter 3 discusses the legal considerations that relate to data distribution when
that data contains PII, also specifically addressing the RDC. It also discusses laws,
regulations, and standard bodies.
• Chapter 4 examines related work and how processes like de-identification practices
are changing due to emerging threats including re-identification.
• Chapter 5 presents a risk taxonomy for the RDC and discusses the framework for
assessing risk.
• Chapter 6 applies the framework to a real-world scenario and makes a determination
for disclosure.
• Chapter 7 summarizes our progress towards establishing a baseline for researchers
and recommends potential future work.
7




The de-identification of data sets affects multiple areas of study, well beyond the realm of
computer science. Chapter 2 defines relevant concepts and conveys contextual information
so as to establish a baseline of understanding. We focus first on illuminating concepts
within the digital forensics field, as well as contextualizing how our research relates to those
concepts, then we define PII and examine various PII data types. Finally, we on define risk,
de-identification, and influential factors that aid in the retrieval and removal of PII data from
information systems.
2.1 Digital Forensics
Originally applied to law enforcement, digital forensics stems from the broader field of
Forensic Science. Mark Pollitt [21] asserts that the termdigital forensics did not exist prior to
1985; however, due to the growth of personal computers, digital forensics came to be because
the hobbyists in law enforcement at the time saw value in computers as aids to investigations.
The International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) was formed
in 1989 [21]. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) defines Forensic Science as “the
application of sciences ... to matters of law” [22]. Thus, since its infancy, digital forensics
has maintained an evidence-based ethos, endeavoring “to identify, collect, examine, and
analyze data while preserving the integrity of information and maintaining a strict chain
of custody” to avoid compromising evidence [23]. The study of digital forensics not only
encompasses the examination of data, but also places important emphasis on how data is
collected. Today, the utility of digital forensic techniques goes beyond the scope of law
enforcement. Many organizations apply digital forensic methods to collect and analyze data
from various sources in areas such as incident response, asset recovery, and operational
problem solving. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
Publication (SP) 800-86 Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response
emphasizes that “practically every organization needs to have the capability to perform
digital forensics” or “would have difficulty determining what events,” such as exposure of
protected and sensitive information, “have occurred within its systems and networks” [23].
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Like everything digital, digital forensics has evolved rapidly and substantially since its
inception in the 1980s, and as any science, is subject to high standards. Digital forensic
methods follow scientific standards that place significance on quality of data, not merely the
quantity of data processed. Because the results of forensic methods provide substantiation
for and are admissible in legal proceedings, the integrity of data and correctness of methods
must be proven, and the chain of custody be transparent and well-documented. The 1993
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., established
the “Daubert Standard,” which became the basis for the standards for digital forensic
methods by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and NIST [24]. The
standard discusses the legal criteria that constitutes a scientific technique as reliable. These
characteristics are empirically tested and peer reviewed, and they require disclosure of
potential error and control standards, and acceptance by the scientific community [24]. ISO
5725 and NIST’s General Test Methodology for Computer Forensic Tools specifies that, in
order for a method to be validated, it must state its purpose, and it must go through extensive
examination using empirical evidence to assure accuracy, or the trueness1 and precision2 of
its results [26], [27]. Therefore, procedures for a valid test method ensure that “test results
must be repeatable and reproducible” [28].
While digital forensics remains subject to excellent legal standards, it evolves so quickly
that the laws that cover and relate to it quickly become antiquated. Conventional digital
forensic practices may have adequately addressed legal and civil investigations for evidence
recovery in the past; however, this has changed due to the pervasive use of data and digital
devices used every day and in every facet of our lives. The landscape of data has changed
such that the “scale of data [that] must be analyzed is vast, the variety of data types is
enormous ... and the forensic investigator today must make sense of any data that might be
found on any device anywhere on the planet” [29]. With such diverse and so much data, it
is terrifically complicated to apply laws correctly and keep them up to date. Further legal
implications regarding data are covered in Chapter 3.
1ISO 3534-1 defines trueness as “the closeness of agreement between the average value obtained from a
large series of test results and an accepted reference value” [25].
2ISO 3534-1 defines precision as “the closeness of agreement between independent tests results obtained
under stipulated conditions” [25].
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2.2 Data Science and Big Data
“Big data,” a phrase that typically characterizes a problem-solving approach that uses
massively parallel analytical methods on terabytes or petabytes of data, often stored in data
centers, and may draw on techniques developed in the field of data science field, refers
also to the condition produced by this approach, namely of data sets growing rapidly in
terms of complexity, variety, and size. Issues with big data impact all areas of the sciences,
especially those where the validation of methods rely on real and accurate data sets. Many
organizations struggle with data’s propensity to be “too big, too fast, or too hard for existing
tools to process” [30], or what is more commonly known as Gartner’s three Vs: volume,
velocity, and variety. Introduced in 2001 and defined below, the three Vs concept is an
effort to describe the components that comprise and complexify big data [30] (IBM also
added another vector, veracity) [31]
• Volume relates to the rapid growth of data being generated, used, and stored. Essen-
tially expanding the scale of data, the growth in disk storage capacity with Kryder’s
Law3 has grown from compact disc (CD) - read only memory (CD-ROM) devices,
and universal serial bus (USB) flash drives, to millions of data centers and mass
migrations toward cloud storage services [32]. Mass consumption of multimedia,
increase of quality and size of files, and 2.5 quintillion bytes of data generated every
day only adds to the volume.
• Velocity refers to the speed of data transmission and how fast it can be processed.
Is data transferred through a network in batches, in real-time, or streaming? Is the
analysis and processing of data immediate, or does it require storage? The speed of
information and analysis has grown rapidly; for example, financial transactions can
now be made and verified instantly [31].
• Variety refers to the heterogeneity data types. These various data types are primarily
categorized as either structured or unstructured (see Section 2.9.1). We discuss
the taxonomy of data in greater detail in Section 5.1. The trend, however, is that
the variety of data types increases constantly while the majority of data remains
unstructured [31].
• Veracity refers to the accuracy or integrity of information within a data set. The
variety and enormous volume of data makes quality control difficult. Traditional
3areal storage density
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methods are inadequate to process unstructured data, and, since the majority of data
generated is unstructured, the accuracy of unstructured data sets comes into question.
Digital forensics must overcome problems stemming from all four factors. The digital
forensic community has been tackling the challenges of big data and slowly making strides,
a concept addressed in Chapter 4.
However, research in forensics faces an additional problem: much of the data of interest
contains PII. As conventional digital forensic methods become obsolete or struggle to keep
up [29], researchers want larger and larger data sets to develop new, scalable approaches.
Unfortunately, large data sets containing user PII in heterogeneous unstructured file formats
raise potentially far-ranging legal and privacy concerns. A recent Berkley data science
article raises the following question. Can current technology securely and responsibly share
large data sets that contain PII [33]? In order for digital forensics to responsibly share large
data sets, analysts need current standards to assess potential risk. In the article, researcher
Garfinkel makes the point that analysts need to “do more than search and present,” and
he writes that they also need to "develop new scientific techniques in data analysis, sense-
making, machine learning and related fields” [16]. In order to develop tools capable of
meeting the needs of law enforcement agencies, government organizations, and private
corporations, researchers need access to data sets that reflect both big data and real world
conditions.
2.3 PII, PI, and Identifying Information
Although variations in terminology exist (mostly due to the sectoral4 nature of U.S. privacy
laws and regulation), the general term PII connotes information that identifies a specific
individual. NIST SP 800-122 defines PII as follows:
Personally identifiable information is any information about an individualmain-
tained by an agency, including (i) any information that can be used to distinguish
or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date,
4When referring to laws, the U.S.’s approach to privacy is sectoral, meaning that laws and regulations only
apply to certain sectors and are very specific, whereas, for example, the European Union (EU)’s approach to
privacy law is more comprehensive and encompasses all industries [34].
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and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (ii) any
other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical,
educational, financial, and employment information [8].
In NIST internal report (IR) 8053, Garfinkel cites inconsistencies with the usage of PII
by various groups and states that “personal information is used to denote information
from individuals, and identifying information is used to denote information that identifies
individuals” [11]. In this thesis, we consider personally identifiable information (PII)
and identifying information to have the same meaning. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship
between different categories of information relevant to our research: information, personal
information, identifying information, and sensitive identifying information. Identifying
information or PII is a subset of PI which also means that all PII is PI, but not all PI is PII,






Figure 2.1. “Venn Diagram Depicting Set Relationships of Sensitive-PII and
Information Categorization: SPII ⊆ PII ⊆ PI ⊆ Information.” Source: [1].
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2.3.1 Types of Identifiers
What is an identifier? The ISO defines an identifier as a categorical variable, whose value
holds information that may establish identity [11]. Identifiers refer to a “natural person”5
or persons, also known as data subject(s) [36]. So, identifiers refer to natural persons, and
there are several categories of identifiers. The categories of identifiers used in a data set
depend on the privacy model, regulations, and the volume and variety of data processed.
The process of de-identification for privacy management refers to several direct and indirect
(or quasi-) identifiers, including: biometric identifiers, personal health information (PHI)
identifiers, financial identifiers, persistent identifiers, and many more [11].
Direct Identifiers
NIST defines direct identifiers as directly identifying data, meaning that the variable data
contained is unique to one specific individual and can, therefore, explicitly identify that
individual without other relational or linked information [11]. Examples of direct identifiers
include: names, social security numbers, and email addresses. Most policies and regulations
stipulate that direct identifiers be removed or redacted from, or at least anonymized within,
any documents or other data sets before disclosure.
Indirect Identifiers or Quasi-Identifiers
As opposed to direct identifiers, indirect identifiers (also known as non-unique identifiers or
quasi-identifiers) do not alone contain the information to "identify a specific individual" [11].
However, also according to NIST, when "aggregated and linked with other information,"
indirect identifiers can be used to identify specific data subjects [11]. Some examples
of indirect identifiers include ZIP codes, sex, race, and birthdays. If the information
contained in an indirect identifier is specific enough, a deduction could be made from a
population, thus the identity of a person could be inferred with very few aggregated indirect
identifiers [11]. Depending on policy, indirect or quasi-identifiers may not be removed from
publicly disclosed material. Garfinkel highlights further trickiness when it comes to quasi-
identifiers: they are not as easily identifiable, removing them can harm the utility of the data
set, and quasi-identifiers can cause re-identification risk once someone has already gone to
5The term natural person is used in ISO technical specification (TS) 25237:2008 and other standards
regarding PII, when referring to identifiers, personal data, et cetera. The ISO also makes the distinction
between natural persons and legal persons. Legally, a natural person refers to a human being, while legal
persons are entities, such as organizations or companies, that have some duties and legal obligations but may
not carry human rights [35].
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the trouble of removing them; therefore, he assesses that data controllers need to weigh the
risks between potential re-identification and utility when dealing with quasi-identifiers [11].
2.3.2 Sensitive and Non-Sensitive PII/Identifying Information
Finding the identity of a specific person online using PI is relatively effortless and common.
A vast majority of technology users have digital footprints and established online identities.
Also, even people that choose not to establish themselves online can be subject to having
their directly identifying data (their names, addresses, and names of family members, for
example) publicly available. Some states also publish voter registration information, so
choosing to register to vote may carry the risk of having your home address and political
party preference published [11]. However, not all displays of personal information online,
whether the person chooses them or not, carry the same risk. To a malicious attacker, some
types of PII are more valuable than others and can be monetized, often with detrimental
effects to the individual. Depending on the hacker’s intention, gains other than financial may
be sought. Therefore, establishing a qualitative metric of sensitivity regarding publishing
data allows researchers to evaluate risk and measure the impact of disclosure [8].
Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII)
The DOD defines Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII) as any information
about a person which would, if lost, stolen, or compromised, present a significant risk or
could cause harm to an individual, so that non-sensitive personally identifiable information
(NSPII)6, as opposed to SPII, is perceived to be “minimal or non-existent” [6]. For reference,
DOD-defined examples of PII and whether they are sensitive or non-sensitive are illustrated
in Table 2.1. The directive continues to point out that not all PII exposure may cause
harm and that NSPII falls under this category. NSPII also identifies an individual but such
information may already be public. Details on what constitutes minimal risk and harm are
discussed in Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4.
6Non-Sensitive PII is also known as Internal Government Operations or Business PII [6].
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Table 2.1. DOD List of Sensitive and Non-Sensitive PII. Source: [6], [7].
Sensitive PII Non-Sensitive PII
Names - official or others Location of an office
Citizenship, legal status Business email address
Gender, race-ethnicity, sexual orientation Zip Code
Birth date, place of birth Business telephone
Home, personal cell phone numbers Business cards
Personal home, email, mailing addresses Published work or projects
Religious affiliations or preference Employment history in resume
Security clearance Badge numbers
Mother’s maiden and middle names Schools attended and graduated
Government ID numbers - driver’s license, full or
partial social security, passport, etc.
Memberships and donation info
Marriage and family - spouse, marital status, chil-
dren, emergency contact
Health records - medical, biometric, disability, in-
surance
Financial information - credit cards, account num-
bers, types of accounts
Law enforcement information
Educational records - student info, grades, tran-
scripts, class schedules, billing7
2.4 Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
In addition to potential harm to individuals, we face potential large-scale harm from cyberse-
curity attacks, and the U.S. government has increased relevant laws and systems according
to the CIA security objectives. In response to the growing number of cybersecurity at-
tacks on U.S. information infrastructures, the Federal Information Security Management
Act (FISMA) was enacted in 2002 to build an information security framework and stan-
dardize federal information systems [37]. An information system (IS) is comprised of
7A complete listing can be found within the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) statute.
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information resources that manage all information processes of an agency and provide op-
erational support to help facilitate its mission [37]. FISMA defines information security
as the “protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability” [9]. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability triad (CIA-triad)
of security objectives provide three key foundational principles that guide information se-
curity decisions [37]. According to FISMA, confidentiality refers to "preserving autho-
rized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting
personal privacy and proprietary information” [37]. Integrity refers to “guarding against
improper information and modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information
non-repudiation and authenticity” [37]. Finally, availability refers to “ensuring timely and
reliable access to and use of information” [37].
Tasked by FISMA to produce the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199,
NIST helped federal agencies secure and evaluate their information and ISs. FIPS 199
directs agencies to first take stock of their information and then to define and place that
information into categories called information types [9]. For example, where an IS may be
processing credit card information, the information type would be financial. In addition,
FIPS 199 guidelines incorporated security categories where information types can be mea-
sured against the “potential impact” if there was a loss in CIA-triad security objectives [9].
This concept is further addressed in Section 2.5.3. The potential impacts show what poten-
tial consequences the agency would face to its assets, processes, and people. Equation 2.1
illustrates how FIPS 199 performs a security categorization using a security category (SC)
information type [9].
SC information type = [(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)]
(2.1)
2.4.1 PII Confidentiality Impact Level
Given different levels of potential impact a security breach might cause, NIST SP 800-122
established guidelines called the PII Confidentiality Impact Levels (CILs) on how to cat-
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egorize PII based on potential risk and impact due to loss of confidentiality. When PII
“sensitivity” level is high, if compromised the loss of “confidentiality” would yield catas-
trophic harm in the CIL classification table. NIST uses the legal definition of confidentiality,
meaning "preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, includ-
ing means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information" [38]. Table 2.2
illustrates how, when PII is evaluated under PII CILs guidelines, it is placed into one of
three categories: low, moderate, or high [8].
Table 2.2. Personally Identifiable Information Confidentiality Impact Level
Category Designations and Definitions. Source: [8], [9].
PII Confidentiality Impact Levels
Low Limited Adverse Effect Onlyminor harm to human subjects.
Effectiveness of function is notice-
ably reduced. Small degradation of
capability
Moderate Serious Adverse Effect Significant harm. No death or seri-
ous life injury. Significant degrada-
tion and capability.
High Severe or Catastrophic
Adverse Effect
Severe catastrophic harm. Loss of
life and serious life threatening in-
juries. Major financial loss. Not
capable to perform.
As researchers process vast amounts of data, direct or quasi identifiers may be hard to
determine. Even if a specific identifier is identified, understanding how a breach or acci-
dental disclosure could harm an individual may not be obvious. Referring back to NIST
SP800-122 applying these factors in Table 2.3 will help define and categorize PII.
Table 2.3. Contributing Factors that Determine PII CILs. Where d-ID is a
Direct Identifier and q-ID Means Quasi Identifier. Source: [8].
Factors Definition Impact
Identifiability How easily PI can uniquely identify an individual. d-ID has greater
impact than q-ID
Quantity of PII Number of human data subjects affected or the size of the compromised







Evaluate the sensitivity of PII data fields (i.e., database). Also evaluate
linking factor between multiple q-ID data fields to obtain identity.
single or combo
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Context Purpose for PII and how it is used - FIPPS principled. PI from classified











Figuring out impact by how accessible information is and probability
for breach due to location.




2.5 Risk and Organizational Risk Assessment Considera-
tions
To further understand the complexities inherent in data and privacy, we define and contex-
tualize the notion of risk, as what constitutes risk (let alone the notion of unacceptable or
acceptable risk) necessarily varies given an individual’s or organization’s objectives. The
ISO defines risk as the “effect of uncertainty on [an entity’s] objectives," where an effect can
present either positive opportunities or negative threats and vulnerabilities or a combination
of both [39]. The ISO’s explanation of risk may be viewed as panoptic, but it is common
sense to note that objectives necessarily vary depending on the particular entity’s mission,
resources, and levels of strategy. Organizations can have different risk attitudes [40], mind-
sets regarding how to handle and evaluate risk. Although most organizations seek to benefit
from opportunities, some organizations measure risk by performing risk evaluations geared
toward measuring potential loss and, therefore, their risk attitude is designed to scrutinize
components that could jeopardize a system. To use a very simple example, if the main
priority of organization A is to protect sensitive information and preserve confidentiality,
then A’s risk attitude would be considered risk averse [41]. Since the impact of loss in
confidentiality is high, organization A may decide not to take the risk. If the objectives
of another organization, B, required quick and reliable access to information (availability),
B might be more willing to consider trade-offs. The risk attitude of B would be to incur
higher levels of risk while seeking benefits from opportunities, known as increasing risk
appetite [40]. Ultimately, for any organization, risk assessment is likely to boil down to
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weighing potential benefits against potential consequences, as well as the severity of impact
of those consequences on organizational assets and objectives.
To somewhat mitigate the complexity inherent in defining risk and provide further context,
additional definitions follow. Less ambiguous than the ISO’s definition, the NIST SP 800-37
defines risk as
a measure of the extent to which an entity or individual is threatened by a poten-
tial circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact
that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of
occurrence [42].
Definitions of risk provided byNIST’s standards tend to alignmorewith, or givemoreweight
to, security and privacy objectives, which focus on protection from loss of confidentiality.
As stated in Section 2.4, the quality of confidentiality focuses on preserving access to
a “secret”, therefore any PII leak or exposure loss may be irreversible. Residual risk is
the remaining level of risk after mitigating factors, such as security controls, safeguards,
or countermeasures have been implemented [2]. In the case where risk is completely
unmitigated before or without controls, the level of risk is known as inherent [43].
Without context, measuring risk is a nebulous task. Therefore, it is the organization’s
responsibility, with regards to their circumstances, to frame, assess, respond, and monitor
potential risks, a process known as risk management [5], shown in Figure 2.2. According
to NIST SP 800-30, risk is assessed within a risk management strategy when organizational
objectives, responsibilities, assets, and participants are fully framed [2]. The purpose of a
risk assessment, then, is to identify and measure risk so as to make less risky decisions.
Assessing risk means evaluating and making prudent assumptions about threats, vulnera-
bilities, impacts, and the likelihood of harm throughout all levels of an organization [2].
2.5.1 Risk Management Framework (RMF)
The DOD, like any organization, requires a solid process, or framework, to assess and
manage risk, commonly known as an RMF. Before 2015, the DOD Information Assurance
Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) was the standard information assur-
ance body that evaluated all DOD ISs for cybersecurity risks and privacy protections [44].
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DIACAP’s Certification and Accreditation (CnA) process authorized IS operations, con-
ducted security assessments, and provided regulatory compliance [44]. Although providing
risk management, DIACAP’s view on risk was static and lacked the continual monitoring
that would make the RMF adaptable to changes in the system [42]. While some risk factors
remain constant, like a bank always risks a robbery and, therefore, should always account
for that risk by implementing security controls to mitigate potential loss, other risks fluc-
tuate. Also, while the greed that motivates bank robberies may be a constant, the tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) utilized by adversaries change over time [42]. As orga-
nizations increase their technological and operational capabilities, adversaries are likely to
find weaknesses in the new systems; therefore, risk is inherently dynamic [42].
In 2015, in response to the need to have a more adaptable RMF that considered risk as
dynamic, the DOD adopted NIST SP 800-37 [42]. NIST SP 800-37 provides an RMF for
federal organizations that offers an adaptable system life cycle approach where constant
monitoring throughout all levels of an the enterprise provides faster response to operational
changes or risk [42]. It is important to note that frameworks encompass themanagement of a
whole organization, starting with a broad approach to managing a three-tiered systemwhere
Tier One is the organization or governance structure, Tier Two the logistical/operational
mission layer, and Tier Three is the information systems and control level [42]. The DOD’s
RMF is a six step process, laid out below.
• Step 1: Categorize information systems by its information types. Some information
systems contain more sensitive PI than others (i.e., health versus social) [42].
• Step 2: Select the foundational security controls that will help protect the information
and allow it to operate initially. Depending on the needs of the information system,
some security controls promote more access control while others focus on availability
[42].
• Step 3: Implement the security controls and document their need and operation [42].
• Step 4: Assess if security controls that were implemented are functioning properly
and protecting information systems [42]. Table 2.2 shows the steps to risk assessment.
• Step 5: Authorize the determination made after a risk assessment. Consider if the
implemented remediations from the assessment phases are “acceptable” [42].
• Step 6: Monitor, a crucial component to RMF. Observe whether security controls
are working effectively or are growing outdated due to new threats. Monitoring
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allows security controls to evolve and adapt to changes and factors in risk’s dynamic
properties [42].
The DOD’s RMF focuses on identifying and mitigating potential risks within the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability triad (CIA-triad) security model. The RMF covers
loss of confidentiality issues, while also focusing primarily on cybersecurity threats and





Figure 2.2. NIST Risk Management Process Depicting the Four Steps of
Risk Assessment. Source: [2].
2.5.2 Privacy Risk Management Framework (PRMF)
Since organizational and individual risk management differ, the DOD also implemented
NIST IR 8062, a risk management methodology specifically designed to evaluate privacy
risks for individuals [3]. The privacy risk management framework (PRMF) is influenced
by the RMF but differs in scope, drawing a distinction between cybersecurity and privacy
risk management, where adverse impacts are caused by an IS’s operations including how
information is processed rather than by a breach in confidentiality [3]. NIST IR 8062 notes
that factors that contribute to privacy risk fall outside what is typically considered a threat
or vulnerability area [3]. To address these differences, the PRMF establishes privacy risk
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engineering objectives and a privacy risk model that includes four phases [3] as shown in
Figure 2.3.
The four phases and six processes of the PRMF can be understood as follows. The first
phase is to frame risk, first by business objectives and then by organization. Business
objectives help an entity serve its purpose by setting up a beginning to end risk management
strategy while organizational privacy forms the legal and privacy oriented structure to
operate [3]. Then, an organization evaluates both its functional and privacy risks, using risk
assessments [3]. Risk and risk components are identified, including threats, vulnerabilities,
harm or impact to subjects, and the probabilities of each [3]. The calculations resulting
from the assessment are used for risk determination [3]. The third phase, where privacy
controls are as designed, focuses on how to safeguard or reduce privacy risk, which can
be technical controls or defined by Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) [3]. Risk
response considers and compares compare risk with organizational objectives, such as
risk tolerance, and responds with appropriate action [2]. The fourth phase, monitoring
change, happens after the controls are implemented and keeps watch of how personal
information is managed [3]. Since the PRMF focuses exclusively on privacy risk factors,
NIST IR 8062 advises that an organization should execute a RMF strategy concurrently
with PRMF to defend against unauthorized access [3]. The PRMF redefines privacy
risk in reference to what NIST IR 8062 calls data actions which are "IS operations that
process personal information. [Processing] can include, but is not limited to, the collection,
retention, logging, generation, transformation, disclosure, transfer, and disposal of personal
information” [3].
Privacy Risk Model Equation
Generally, when organizations conduct quantitative risk assessments, risk is calculated by:
(i) the probability that an event may occur, and (ii) the event’s potential impact [3]. In terms
of PII and risk management, the NIST IR 8062 draft on PRMF provides the formula for




likelihood of (PDA) × impact of (PDA) (2.2)
The PRMF privacy equation measures risk through problematic data actions (PDAs). A
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PDA is “a data action that causes an adverse effect or problem, for individuals” [3]. For
example, if an organization collects more PII than what is needed for them to operate, it
has the potential to cause even more and unnecessary harm to the individual if there is a
breach [3].
Privacy Engineering Objectives
NIST IR 8062 also provides a privacy security model. The privacy security model in the
DOD’s PRMF has a similar focus as information security’s CIA-triad: it focuses on three
privacy-preserving ISs, predictability, manageability, and disassociability (PMD) [3]. Pre-
dictability, “is the enabling of reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators
about personal information and its processing by an information system” [3]. Manage-
ability, “is providing the capability for granular administration of personal information
including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure” [3]. Disassociability “is enabling
the processing of personal information or events without association to individuals or de-
vices beyond the operational requirements of the system” [3]. The PMD model is a privacy
preserving model that uses the principles set by FIPPs.
PRMF is currently being drafted in NISTIR 8062 and although standards in privacy pre-
serving models are in their nascency, privacy risk is becoming a bigger concept now due
to the pervasive dissemination and collection of PI by the Internet of Things, companies,
and legitimate entities [3]. Additionally, the loss of control over an individual’s information
or even attributes allows linkages to occur and makes re-identification attacks possible as
described in Chapter 4.
2.5.3 Risk Equation
The risk equation (see Equation 2.3), is useful in qualitative risk assessments because it
helps rank and categorize. Reducing risk into smaller categorical components helps us
identify characteristics and aids in risk model and policy development.
Although not solely used for confidentiality or privacy protection, the risk equation is a
common construct in information assurancewhen referring to principles of riskmanagement
[45].
Risk =




























Figure 2.3. NIST Privacy Risk Management Framework (PRMF) Diagram:
Built on top of the RMF, this diagram shows six distinct cyclical processes
that organizations can utilize to responsibly secure and protect the privacy
of ISs and data subjects. Source: [3].
Threats
A threat is comprised of a threat source(s) and threat event(s) [2]. NIST SP 800-30 explains
that a threat originates from a threat source(s), a source that exhibits “(i) the intent and
method targeted at the exploitation of a vulnerability or (ii) a situation and method that
may accidentally exploit a vulnerability” [2]. If the threat source(s) are highly probable and
effective, this triggers the threat event, which could be a single or set of events, actions, or
circumstances [2]. The definition and potential consequences of a threat event are contained
within the definition of threat provided by NIST SP 800-30:
any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through
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an IS via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of infor-
mation, and/or denial of service [2].
NIST SP 800-30 also provides a list of threat source(s). These examples may be categories
that require more subdivision if necessary. They are:
• purposeful/hostile cyber or physical attacks
• environmental disruptions
• human errors of omission and commission/machine errors
• structural failures of organization-controlled resources which can include: hardware,
software, environmental controls, and failed security controls
• man-made disasters, accidents, and failures beyond the control of an organization [2]
When threat events and sources are identified, an organization is able to contrive hypothetical
threat scenarios where, especially in the case of adversaries, brainstorming of TTP occur.
Identifying potential TTP provides threat characteristics which help organizations construct
threat taxonomies [2].
Vulnerabilities
Asmentioned within the NIST definition of threat, a vulnerability is a predisposed weakness
in a system that could be exploited inadvertently or with intent, by a threat source or com-
bination of sources [2]. Vulnerabilities can include a weakness in a specific program or a
combination of flaws that exist throughout all levels of a system or organization. Some com-
mon examples include social engineering, where an employee is manipulated into granting
privileged access, or poor system design or project execution where security controls were
never implemented [2]. In information assurance (IA) training, the vulnerability compo-
nent in the risk equation (see Equation 2.3) is the point at which an organization’s defense
intersects with an adversary or threat [45].
Impact
NIST SP 800-122 defines impact as follows.
The magnitude of harm that can be expected to result from the consequences
of unauthorized disclosure of information, unauthorized modification of in-
formation, unauthorized destruction of information, or loss of information or
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information system availability [8].
In regards to the risk equation, we measure impact in regards to the level of harm. Harm
is inflicted on either the individual or an organization. Organizational harm, as opposed to
individual harm refers to “any adverse effects that would be experienced by an individual
whose PII was the subject of a loss of confidentiality, as well as any adverse effects
experienced by the organization that maintains PII. Harm to an individual includes any
negative or unwanted effects (i.e., that may be socially, physically, or financially damaging)”
[8].
NIST SP 800-122 provides the following as examples of impact placed upon an individual:
“blackmail, identity theft, physical harm, discrimination, humiliation, or emotional distress”
[8].
Security Controls and Safeguards
Organizations implement security controls and safeguards in order to reduce the impact
of harm. Their implementation can reduce the likelihood of an unwanted event. Security
controls can come in various forms including policy, operational, or technical controls [3].
Security controls can include a statistical algorithm designed to hide identity within a
dataset (i.e., differential privacy) or anything that masks or performs de-identification on
an identifiable person [11]. De-identification is also a security control, which provides
confidentiality to the data subject while also making that data set available to researchers.
2.5.4 Minimal Risk
The DOD and ethical codes on human subject research use the term minimal risk as a
determinant for public disclosure [6]. The DOD defines minimal risk as a situation where
the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research
are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations
or tests [46].8
8DOD Instruction 3216.02 makes extended clarification that (section 219.102 (i) of [U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR)]) “shall not be interpreted to include the inherent risks certain categories of human subjects
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Many risk assessments use minimal risk, also known as acceptable risk, as a threshold for
what information can be disclosed to the public.
2.6 Pseudonymization
One way to protect privacy in a data set containing PII is through pseudonymization.
Pseudonymization is a form of masking that obscures or replaces the original direct iden-
tifiers with artificial data or some symbolic place holder (i.e., hashes, numbers, letters,
codes) [8]. Between NIST SP800-122 and NIST IR 8053, there is some discrepancy as
to whether pseudonyms are considered de-identification. Garfinkel in NIST SP 800-188
specifically addresses pseudonyms as not de-identified [48]. Pseudonymization is useful
because it generally removes the identity of the real data subject while still preserving some
of the links or relationships in the data set [11]. Pseudonyms should be used only if the
identity of a data subject needs to be preserved due to the objectives of the data controller,
who may use encryption to keep identity confidential, and then later de-crypt when identifi-
cation is necessary. It is important to address that the Common Rule does not view “coded”
pseudonyms as anonymous [3].
Pseudonymization is considered by Garfinkel as a trade-off between protecting privacy and
preserving data set utility but can be viewed as less secure or more prone to re-identification
attacks [11].
2.7 De-identification
Another formof protecting privacy in a data set containing PII is de-identification. Similar to
the sectoral variations and differing usages of the term PII, “de-identification” does not have
a single authoritative definition. As Garfinkel states in NISTIR 8053, de-identification is
often confused or used interchangeably with terms like anonymization, pseudonymization,
and sanitization [11]. The ISO standard definition of de-identification is “any process of
removing the association between the set of identifying data and the data subject” [36].
De-identification is achieved through the removal or changing of PII in a data set, so data
face in their everyday life. For example, the risks imposed in research involving human subjects focused on a
special population should not be evaluated against the inherent risks encountered in their work environment
(e.g., emergency responder, pilot, soldier in a combat zone) or having a medical condition (e.g., frequent
medical tests or constant pain)” [47].
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subjects cannot be identified [8]. Processes described in the following sections all facilitate
de-identification but differ in the ways they handle identifying data.
It is important to note that de-identification does not always mean the identity of a data
subject cannot be recovered. In fact, the legitimacy of de-identification is being called into
question due the emerging threat of re-identification, described in Section 4.1 [49].
2.7.1 Anonymization
A subcategory of de-identification, anonymization is one specific way researchers pro-
tect privacy in a data set containing PII. Like de-identification, anonymization of a direct
identifier disassociates the data subject from the data set, essentially removing all of the con-
necting links [48]. In NIST IR 8053, Garfinkel explains that anonymization is irreversible,
so, while it protects privacy, if that data is ever needed, it will no longer be available [48].
2.7.2 Sanitization and Redaction
Another way to protect privacy in a data set containing PII is through sanitization or redac-
tion. According to Garfinkel, sanitization is the erasing or the overwriting of information
on a hard disk [50]. Depending on the file system, erasing a file may mean the operating
system (OS) frees the block but leaves the file data until it is written over by another
process [50]. Overwriting not only frees blocks that contain the file data but overwrites
them using ASCII NULL or more sophisticated Guttman patterns [50]. Also a form of
de-identification, redaction removes or blacks out information [47].
2.8 Health InsurancePortabilityAccountabilityAct (HIPAA)
One particular subset of PII, PHI has long been considered sensitive and has more controls
around its regulation. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) website
defines PHI as information regarding a person’s mental or physical health at any period
of time or information about health care [51]. For instance, names or Social Security
Number (SSN) which are direct identifiers when framed within the context of health records
become PHI, while quasi-identifiers are not considered PHI [51]. PHI is specifically covered
by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which are laws that dictate how PHI should be handled by
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various entities, known as “covered” [52]. It is important to note that once PHI is de-
identified then the privacy rule’s restrictions do not apply to that data set and can be
shared [10]. However, due to re-identification HHS has stipulated that once de-identified
PHI is uncovered, then the privacy rule still protects that data set [10]. HIPAA conducts their
de-identification standard using two methods: expert determination and Safe Harbor [51].
HIPAA’s methods may provide DOD researchers additional context for understanding how
de-identification can happen.
2.8.1 Expert Determination
HIPAA uses expert determination, which provides a statistical method of anonymizing
identities. An expert determination to disclose information can only be made by a statistical
expert who can confirm that the risk is minimal [51]. Since health professionals often
have more background on human resource issues than CS researchers, implementing expert
determination within the DOD would require additional personnel.
2.8.2 Safe Harbor
HIPAA’s other method, the Safe Harbor method, does not require a statistical expert,
and so poses another option for organizations to disclose data sets responsibly [51]. The
Safe Harbor method of de-identification happens through the process of eliminating 18
identifiers, listed in Figure 2.4.
2.8.3 Limited Data Set
While HIPAA’s Safe Harbor method requires that the data controller perform de-
identification on 18 identifiers, a limited data set may not require the removal of quite
so many attributes [10]. That limit does not include direct identifiers, however. Lim-
ited data sets can be disclosed after removal of 16 identifiers listed in Table 2.6, with the
researcher signing a data use agreement (DUA) [10].
The data use agreement must:
• Agree to use a limited data set consistent with reason why it was disclosed
• Name those who are authorized to use the limited data set
30
Table 2.4. Safe Harbor Privacy Rule for De-Identification Comprised of 18
Identifier Types. Source: [10]
18 Identifiers for De-Identification
1. Names.
2. All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street address, city, county,
precinct, ZIP Code, and their equivalent geographical codes, except for the initial three
digits of a ZIP Code if, according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau
of the Census:
2a The geographic unit formed by combining all ZIP Codes with the same three initial digits
contains more than 20,000 people:
2b The initial three digits of a ZIP Code for all such geographic units containing 20,000 or
fewer people are changed to 000.
3. All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including birth
date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89 and all elements
of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may
be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older
4. Telephone numbers.
5. Facsimile numbers.
6. Electronic mail address.
7. Social security numbers.
8. Medical record numbers.
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers.
10. Account numbers.
11. Certificate/license numbers.
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plated numbers.
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers.
14. Web uniform resource locators (URLs).
15. Internet protocol (IP) address numbers.
16. Biometric identifiers, including fingerprints and voice prints.
17. Full-face photographic images and any comparable images.
18. Other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, unless permitted by the Privacy
Rule for re-identification.
• Recipient needs to give assurances that they will not share it with unauthorized users,
have and maintain safeguards, employee monitoring, and not contact or try and reach
out to individual [10]
Limited data sets are shared among trusted researchers with the stipulation of signing a
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DUA. The removal of too many quasi-identifiers can affect the utility of the data. A DUA
enables more data to stay intact, promoting more effective research by keeping information,
like age, intact.
Table 2.6. Limited Data Set required to De-identify 16 Identifier Types from
National Institute of Health. Source: [10].
16 Identifiers for De-Identification
1. Names.
2. Postal address info, other (town or city), state, and ZIP Code.
3. Telephone numbers.
4. Fax numbers.
5. Electronic mail addresses.
6. Social security numbers.
7. Medical record numbers.
8. Health beneficiary numbers.
9. Account numbers.
10. Certificate/license numbers.
11. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate.
12. Device identifiers and serial numbers.
13. Web universal resource locators (URLs).
14. Internet protocol (IP) address numbers.
15. Biometric identifiers, including fingerprints and voice prints.
16. Full-face photographic images and any comparable images.
2.9 Information and PII
2.9.1 Structured and Unstructured Data
When evaluating information systems, computer scientists categorize information as struc-
tured or unstructured. For instance, information contained in a relational database is
structured, because each field has some value associated, and when a query is made, a result
is returned [53]. For unstructured information, a query may not return an answer because
there is no column, row, or field to find. Unstructured data like logs, images, and arbitrary
length text documents pose a problem because, if a tool cannot identify specific PII, then
we cannot de-identify it.
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2.9.2 Storage Devices
Secondary storage devices are comprised of non-volatile memory used for long term storage
needs such as hard drives and flash drives [54]. A secondary storage drivemay be comprised
of one or more volumes which house a file system [55]. These file systems contain various
files whose structure is determined by the OS and applications that created them [54].
To preserve a secondary storage device, a person creates a disk image, which is a “sector by
sector copy of a disk” that can retain all file system info [56]. When a hard drive is imaged,
it is typically done using a write-blocker with proprietary or open source imaging software
like Advanced Forensics Format (AFF) and EnCase [57]. Many of these forensic tool kits
do more than image; some do file system analysis and more.
2.9.3 bulk_extractor
One of the tools we will be using for disk image analysis is bulk_extractor. bulk_extractor
is a powerful forensics tool that, as its name hints, extracts detailed information from
various inputs such as disk images, directories, and files [58]. It can extract information
from compressed files as well, which many similar tools cannot [58]. As this tool was
developed for law enforcement, the extraction of identifying information was the goal [58].
bulk_extractor is capable finding e-mails, URLs, credit card numbers, Global Positioning
System (GPS) coordinates, or simply an entire listing of words contained within [58]. Along
with the extraction, it provides a histogram, a count of every instance that a particular piece
of information or word was present [58].
There are three phases to the operation of bulk_extractor. The first is called the feature
extractor, where the information that is being searched for is extracted and then written to
a text file [58]. Next, a histogram is produced, counting every instance of the feature that
was found [58]. Lastly, the post-processing phase produces the readable report [58].
It is easy to see how this wealth of extracted information might give ability to identify the
owner of the drive. One proven technique is that extracting the e-mails within a system
and sorting to find the result with the highest instances typically identifies the owner of the
file system [58]. Other typical uses are utilizing the word count analysis to aid in password
cracking [58].
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2.9.4 MITRE Identification Scrubber Toolkit (MIST)
Free form text is difficult to analyze when compared to structured data. MIST is a de-
identification tool that leverages natural language processing to analyze documents [59].
Natural language processing is a broad term referring to the application of computational
methods to analyze human language. This tool searches through text, chooses potentially
identifying phrases and then de-identifies them [59]. MIST works by first annotating, or
finding, potential areas of concern using natural language processing [59]. Once these
areas are annotated, its next task is to replace, swapping words or phrases to accomplish
de-identification [59]. For example, if the names of individuals on a list needed to be
de-identified, the processor would annotate every instance of a name and either replace it





If asked, most people would likely have some notion of what constitutes privacy, though, of
course, their notions would differ. Certainly, the notion of privacy has changed over time;
while the World Wars’ generations tended to consider privacy more of a human right, at
least in the United States, the current generations willingly post private details. This shift
necessitates a revamped understanding of both ethical and legal privacy considerations, one
which acknowledges an individual’s right to be left alone and the desire for freedom and
discretion to disclose personal information without intrusion, while accounting for the fact
that what may be considered private to one person may not be for another.
Chapter 2 posits that the definition of privacy is elusive because it is a dynamic social
construct and, therefore, requires context to establish a baseline of understanding to consider
the ramifications of de-identifyingPIIwithin data. In the digital age, users frequently divulge
personal information that should be kept private. Personal information is often divulged
to public and private organizations simply in order to receive services. For convenience,
our computers also store a lot of user information. When considering how and whether
to de-identify PII from data, it is necessary to consider what PII even looks like on a hard
drive. In what format is it stored, and howmuch or in what location is it saved? While those
fundamental considerations are necessary for CS engineers’ consideration and planning,
first we must look at the potential ramifications and how we have been and currently deal
with and legislate PII concerns. In Section 3.2, we discuss PII with regards to privacy law,
ethics, and the RDC. The following sections define terminology and elucidate how societal
and legal concepts of identity are transposed to data types.
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3.2 Legal andEthical Concerns forResearch onDataCon-
taining PII
Legal and ethical issues hinder the sharing of data sets containing PII, and regulations vary
by region, state, and area of business (assuming we confine our discussion to the U.S.).
Part of the difficulty can be attributed to the fact that, as the Privacy, Data Protection and
Cybersecurity Law Review observes, there is “no single omnibus federal privacy law in
the U.S." nor a "designated central data protection authority” that ensures and protects a
citizen’s PII as a fundamental right [60]. The U.S. implements sectoral, or area-specific,
privacy laws which “regulate only a specific context of information use” in particular areas,
both in public and private sectors [61]. Privacy and data protection in areas such as finance9,
health-care10, electronic communications11, educational records12, and privacy of minors13
have regulatory frameworks to guide people’s actions [60]. Historically, risk has always
been unavoidable and is taken into account when dealing with the management of sensitive
PII in such areas [60]. Although privacy protections exist, the system of privacy regulation
and governance is scattered throughout various departments on federal and state levels,
each defining their own rules and regulations for PII [61], which does not exactly aid in
consistency.
The U.S. judicial system and individuals with grievances also play a part in shaping privacy
law [60]. Private litigation holds organizations accountable and deters those industries that
collect, store, and use PII from unfair, negligent, and deceptive business practices [60].
Attorney Alan Charles Raul states that the “U.S. privacy system is flexible, relying more
on post hoc government enforcement and private litigation;” additionally, he adds that “the
U.S. system does not apply a precautionary principle to protect privacy, but rather allows
injured parties to take legal action” [60].
Despite providing an overview of area-specific regulations, Raul’s assessment of U.S.
9Laws associated with PII in financial sector Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) laws, Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
10Laws associated with PII defined in the healthcare sector HIPAA, Health Information Technology Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH)
11Laws that define PII in electronic communications are Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
12Education laws that dictate PII usage FERPA
13Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
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privacy laws do very little to help the digital research community develop state-of-the-art
tools and methods, leaving researchers with more quandaries than answers.
A dynamic judicial process with checks and balances may have advantages, but, from a
researcher’s perspective, with limited resources and murky definitions, the possibility of a
lawsuit naturally stifles progress. Much of Garfinkel’s work on the RDC dealt with trying
to navigate through this legal and ethical landscape. Garfinkel found what information
privacy lawyers like Paul Ohm also observed: the current sectoral approach to privacy laws
left out entire industries from definitive privacy regulations [49]. The inherent ambiguity
is problematic for researchers who count on the scientific methodology of repeatable and
reproducible results to validate methods and build on foundational work. If data sets cannot
be shared due to the repercussions of disclosed PII of data subjects, and researchers have
no means to mitigate or understand how PII may cause harm, scientists are hindered from
performing experiments on real data sets. Without means to validate methods on real data,
digital forensic tools may work on contrived scenarios but fail when put to operational use,
which reduces their practical value.
3.3 The Belmont Report
The Belmont Report was established by the National Commission for the Protection of Hu-
man Subjects on Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1979 and is the ethical framework
adopted by the human subject research community [15]. The framework consists of three
fundamental principles: “respect for persons, beneficence, and justice” [15]. As stated,
much of U.S. laws on privacy are sectoral especially in regards to digital privacy where
individual protections are not clearly defined [62]. Due to the Belmont report, those who
conduct research using human subjects are ethically bound and follow HHS’s policy known
as the Common Rule. Researchers have the responsibility to maintain and not adversely
affect the welfare of their human subjects (beneficence), therefore, an assessment of risk
should be conducted to the best of their ability to determine if the research is justified [15].
It is the Belmont report that introduces the term minimal risk as defined in Section 2.5.4
and echoed throughout DOD instructions.
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3.4 The Real Data Corpus
An endeavor started by Simson Garfinkel, the RDC was created with the hope of offering
a standardized data set for the digital forensic research community [16]. The scale and
diversity of data is growing, and, because data is user-driven and generated, the RDC
provides researchers with a representative sampling of drives characteristically similar to
those found in the real world.14 Comprised of 3,098 disk images, the RDC is a rich collection
of raw data extracted from various devices such as hard drives, flash memory images that
include USBs, secure digital (SD) cards, memory sticks, CDs, digital camera memory
images, and Global System for Mobiles (GSM) subscriber identity module (SIM) chip
images, all formatted and stored as EnCase Evidence File denoted by extension identifier
“.E01”. The disk images contain a variety of data in different file formats from common
document files in various languages, graphic, or video file formats like Joint Photographic
Experts Group (JPEG) and .mp4, and also binary executables. Many of these RDC files
contain PII of individual users and their disclosure may cause harm.
Because NPS is a research institution, privacy rules concerning the RDC go beyond the
controls implemented by the typical academic institution. NPS purchased all devices in the
RDC from the secondary market, outside the U.S., and those devices contain data collected
from non-U.S. persons and very likely contain various types of PII [16]. The U.S. Supreme
Court decision of California v. Greenwood 486 U.S. 35, in 1988, held that items discarded
or sold in secondary markets do not have reasonable expectation of privacy [63]. Therefore,
sharing the RDC would not be illegal, regardless of whether data contained private user
PII and regardless of ethical concerns. However, NPS is a research institution. The RDC
was established for the purpose of scientific research and education, so NPS researchers are
bound to ethical codes of conduct for human subject research.
Additionally, NPS is a U.S. Navy school, one of a handful of academic institutions under
DOD purview, and, therefore, subject to additional controls, including review and permis-
sion by the IRB before any human subjects research can be conducted. Since the RDC
is federally funded and contains authentic data and “identifiable private information” from
real living people, any research conducted on the RDCmust abide by the National Research
14Garfinkel notes that images bought from secondary markets may have more instances of drive sanitiza-
tion, corruption, disk failure or reformatting, which researchers should account for because it ties into the
motivations of why a used item was resold [16].
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Act (NRA) of 1974 and title 45 CFR part 46, the Common Rule, which considers user-
generated data to be human subject research [64]. That includes the research contained
in this thesis and any research conducted on the RDC by NPS. Since the RDC was pre-
collected NPS research may fall under “existing” data, defined in 45 CFR 46.101(b)(4),
where an exemption can be made if “the information be recorded by the investigator... in
such a manner that the subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked
to subjects” [65]. Although this thesis investigates responsible methods of de-identification
on the RDC to reserve data subject anonymity, 45 CFR 46.101 requires that, after research
and use of such data sets, all information considered identifiable (including the original
source) will have to be destroyed, which does not serve the research objectives of NPS with
reliability and reproducibility [66]. Most Common Rule investigations are also required to
seek informed consent of the data subject [66]. NPS research is not able to do this, due to
the purchasing of hard drives via the secondary market. Our research was given exemption
from 45 CFR 117(c)(1) [65]. This thesis seeks to de-identify all PII produced from results,
and our risk tolerance is aimed at not releasing anything above minimal risk. The U.S. HHS
grants IRBs approval authority on any experimental research involved with human subjects
and holds them responsible for upholding HHS ethical standards and policies on human
subject protection [67]. The RDC is maintained by NPS with approval of access determined
by its IRB. NPS also falls under DON jurisdiction, which has considered the collection
as controlled unclassified information (CUI) as well as for official use only (FOUO); those
item are discussed in more detail in Section 3.5.
Any human subjects research at NPS is under further controls and standards. As a compo-
nent of the DOD, NPS is subject to DOD Instruction 3216.02, which concerns conducting
human subject research [47]. Specifically, DOD Instruction 3216.02 defines a human subject
as an "individual about whom an investigator conducting research obtains data through in-
tervention or interactionwith the individual or obtains identifiable private information" [47].
As a Navy institution, NPS must also abide by Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction
3900.39D, Human Research Protection Program, which states that the "rights, welfare, in-
terests, privacy, confidentiality, and safety of human subjects shall be held paramount at all
times and all research projects shall be conducted in a manner that avoids all unnecessary
physical or mental discomfort, and economic, social, or cultural harm" [46]. It is essential
for an organization to define its objectives when assessing risk, especially when building
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the foundations of an RMF. Research and education are, necessarily, not the only DOD
objectives. However, the DOD recognizes the RDC’s value for research and refers to the
Common Rule standards within their policies.
3.5 Controlled Unclassified Information
In addition to controls via ethical and DOD human subjects research laws, the RDC is
considered CUI. CUI is unclassified nonetheless restricted in distribution because, in some
cases, according to DOD 5200.01, some unclassified data may“require application of access
and distribution controls and protective measures for a variety of reasons” [68]. CUI was
established by Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, which replaces
the sensitive but unclassified (SBU) classification. ExecutiveOrder 13556was implemented
to create uniformity amongst classification categories across all departments in the executive
branch, specifically regarding unclassified information [69]. CUI now includes the control
and protection of the following types of unclassified information: FOUO, law enforcement
sensitive (LES), DOD unclassified controlled nuclear information (UCNI), and limited
distribution; these types of CUI all fall under DOD CUI [68] and are subject to the rules and
policies of the DOD Information Security Program [68]. In general, some characteristics
that require information be considered CUI include: needing to be reviewed and approved
before public release, potentially export-controlled, and potentially considered to have
permanent value as a record [68].
Containing sensitive information, and warranting special handling under DOD guidelines,
the RDC is considered CUI and, more specifically, FOUO. FOUO, a type of CUI, is
designated so because it can potentially cause harm due to the possibility of violating
certain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) protections [68]. Specifically, the FOIA
protects information as FOUO that "the release of which would reasonably be expected to
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals" [68] and
that concern is why NPS considers the RDC as FOUO. Some of the controls implemented
to protect FOUO are: ensuring valid reasons for access, marking appropriately, and taking
certain security precautions [68].
40
3.6 Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)
With all that protection, it is a wonder that NPS considers any outside research requests
for the RDC, or, for that matter, that NPS students and faculty can access the RDC. It
is important to note that, although the data subjects in the RDC hold no U.S. citizenship,
the RDC still needs to be considered under FIPPs. Experts in the field of de-identification
and PII management refer to FIPPs as a foundational schema to design privacy-preserving
information systems [3]. FIPPs guidelines, produced by theU.S. Federal TradeCommission,
are principles that address fair PII collection and protection practices [70]. The first core
principle is transparency, where people should be aware how, who, and where their PII is
being collected [70]. The second principle is choice, which “gives individuals a choice as
to how their information will be used” [70]. The third principle is information review and
correction, which allows people to check and access their personal information to correct
inaccuracies [70]. The fourth principle, is information protection, where organizations
have the legal responsibility to protect the integrity of people’s PII [70]. The fifth and last
principle is accountability; organizations must comply with FIPPs [70]. Garfinkel states,
in NIST IR 8053, that de-identification does not warrant notification to the data subject,
although this may be contestable [11].
3.7 Organizational Level Security Controls
Because theymay still be subject to financial or other liabilities forwrongfully disclosing PII,
many research institutions implement a data use agreement (DUA) as additional protection.
A DUA is a contractual agreement usually with a third party that outlines special terms of
disclosure regarding the de-identified data set by the data provider [11]. NIST IR 8053 gives
a few examples where a DUA states that the data provider would bar a data requester from
re-identification and blanketed sharing to others, and would accept all liabilities, including
privacy violations due to mismanagement of the data set [11]. DUA should be used in the
following situations.
• When it is considered a Limited Data Set [11]
• If the re-identification of risk seems probable
Many research institutions, universities, and government agencies are utilizing DUA as
insurance beyond IRB approval to prevent third party from re-identification.
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Chapter 4 highlights some of the related work regarding protecting PII within information
systems as well as regarding the current state of de-identification methods and regulations.
Many researchers address vulnerabilities in de-identification and information disclosure
structure. In addition, de-identification researchers are currently studying re-identification
to enhance the way that organizations handle information. Chapter 4 first looks at re-
identification, then privacy perserving models, and, finally, the possibility of synthetic data
sets, which, inherently, would contain no real PII.
4.1 Re-identification
Simple de-identification practices used to be adequate. Practices in de-identification before
what Harvard Professor Sweeney calls today’s “data rich network” proved mostly effective
at providing the public with useful data sets without invading the privacy of individuals
[71]. Both big data and re-identification now pose serious threats to conventional de-
identification practices. For example, organizations in the past believed that the removal
of direct identifiers would make data subjects anonymous in a dataset. In Sweeney’s
Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely, she demonstrates how, even with the
removal of direct or “explicit” identifiers, quasi-identifiers in combination with background
information [11] have the possibility of uniquely identifying an individual [71]. What
troubled proponents of de-identification more was Sweeney’s example of how knowledge
of only a few attributes (she demonstrates using five digit ZIP codes, sex, and birth date)
could identify 87% individuals of the U.S. population specifically [71]. Sweeney’s research
only utilized data sets that were freely available to the public, or available with a nominal
fee [71]. In NIST IR 8053, Garfinkel describes Sweeney’s scenario: she was aware that a
high profile politician was ill at a hospital [11]. She obtained a list of de-identified patients
who were discharged combined with a list of local city voter registration information and
was able to identify the politician [71].
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4.1.1 Linkage Attacks
Linkage attacks occur because the combination of quasi-identifiers or attributes provide
uniqueness by forming links to re-identify what was previously de-identified data [71].
For linkage attacks to work effectively, adversaries require two data sets that contain the
same data subject(s) [11]. Linkage attacks can uniquely identify one person if the same
quasi-identifiers from those data sets have one match [71]. Multiple matches of data
subjects in those datasets means that an adversary could associate each with a probability,
or be able to narrow down potential data subjects, a potential demonstrated in Figure
4.1 [11]. Since de-identification of direct identifiers alone was not sufficient to protect data
Figure 4.1. Sweeney’s Linkage Attack Using Medical Data and Voter List.
Source: [4].
subject confidentiality, quasi-identifiers would then need de-identification [11]. However,
the removal of several quasi-identifiers could significantly reduce the utility of a data
set [11]. NIST IR 8053 lists five ways of de-identifying indirect identifiers: suppression,
generalization, perturbation, swapping, and sub-sampling [11].
Re-identification risk dependencies are:
• Data modalities and content of original data set
• Type of de-identification technique used by data controller
• Adversary’s level of skill
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• Adversary’s resources
• Availability of other external data sets for links
• The risk of re-identification over time as more attributes are made available [3]
According to NIST SP 800-188, re-identification probability “is the probability that an at-
tacker will be able to use information contained in a de-identified dataset to make inferences
about individuals” [48].
4.2 BitCurator Project
Currently, researchers are exploring different methods of safe de-identification. University
of North Carolina Associate Professors, Lee and Woods, in their paper, Automated Redac-
tion of Private and Personal Data in Collections, explore methods of de-identification,
specifically the BitCurator project. The BitCurator project is an endeavor by Information
and Library Science researchers to investigate how data collecting institutions can acquire,
preserve, and provide access to collections while protecting private information embedded
within such collections [57]. Similar to the objective of this thesis, researchers wanted to
find a balance between the protection of private information while retaining the ability to
access collections [57]. Resembling other organizations who strive for transparency (avail-
ability), Information and Library Science researchers saw that PII poses a huge obstacle
for institutions like libraries, so they began the BitCurator project which aims to identify
and provide curators with automated software and reporting methods so that they can be
better stewards of digital information [57]. Lee andWoods identify the PII problem because
they feel that information collecting institutions will lose credibility if they cannot properly
care for digital content, and this may hurt their ability to acquire digital collections or cause
them to face increasing resistance from producers [57]. Their paper defines private and non-
private data and goes into detail about identification and redaction of such material using
open source forensic tools, in particular bulkextractor, fiwalk, Sleuth Kit, and sdhash [57].
As the tools were originally designed for digital forensics, Lee and Woods observed that
these tools would not specifically meet the needs of the Information and Library Scientist.
First, the output of forensics tools does not necessarily lend to digital archival needs [57].
The workflows, or methods in which data integrates into the archival systems, would need
to be looked at for compatibility [57]. Second, the tools did not adequately answer the
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concern of how to make their findings public, allowing portions of the data to be accessible
while not revealing PII [57].
Lee and Woods did have success in using the open-source tools discussed to identify their
collections. In their scenario, they felt the forensics tools yielded a reasonably de-identified
product [57]. Although with remaining instances of private information, they still had to
analyze the risk of disclosure.
4.3 Privacy-Preserving Models
In previous section, we looked at de-identification techniques, but there are other, more
complex ways of anonymizing data subjects. Information systems that are geared more
toward protecting individual privacy and safer de-identification practices are called privacy
preserving models [11]. The goal of privacy preserving information systems is to simul-
taneously provide confidentiality to individual data subjects while also providing available
information to the public. Both privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) and privacy pre-
serving data publishing (PPDP) have their advantages and are used for different reasons as
discussed in this chapter [11].
4.3.1 Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)
PPDM achieves anonymity using statistics and aggregation [11].
Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL)
A method of privacy preservation, statistical disclosure limit (SDL) makes use of a few
different techniques. One technique that SDL uses is generalization, taking specific data
and replacing it with a broader term [11]. For example, the height of an individual can be
replaced with the term "tall" or "short," or replaced with a height range. Another technique
is to swap data within similar types of information [11]. An example of data swapping is
to interchange the ages of individuals on a record, which would not pose a problem for the
researcher if age was not a research factor. Finally, SDL adds noise to the data to obscure
actual information [11].
Differential Privacy
Another method of privacy protection is called differential privacy, which helps quantify de-
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identification in privacy protection [11]. It creates anonymity by adding non-deterministic
noise to an appropriately sized data set [11]. Using a characteristic called the degree of
sameness, identity is lost through aggregation [11]. Similar to the noise generation in SDL,
differential privacy hopes to effect enough change in the data to preserve privacy, while
minimizing the effects on accuracy.
k-anonymity
K-anonymity, another privacy preserving model, focuses on quasi-identifiers [71]. K-
anonymity is achieved by using an equivalence class method. For every combination of
quasi-identifier that can be made, there are "k" matching records, making it anonymous.
This model is prone to unsorted matching attacks, a complementary release attack, and a
temporal attack where k-anonymity loses its ability to provide privacy. This loss of privacy
occurs when the equivalence class lacks proper diversity or if the adversary has background
knowledge of the system [72]. To mitigate privacy loss, an equivalence class has to be
diverse but also has to be distributed appropriately [72].
4.4 Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP)
Similar to privacy preserving models, privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP) is a
de-identification technique where PII is substituted with either partially or fully synthetic
data [11]. There are two methods of creating synthetic data, both using the original dataset
as a source [48]. One method, which produces partially synthetic data, uses data swapping
and generalization similar to SDL, while the other method, which produces fully synthetic
data, creates a dataset based on a modeled version of the original [48].
4.5 Data Release Models
Another way to safely share data containing PII is through the use of data release models,
similar to the DUA discussed previously. In NIST SP800-188, Garfinkel gives examples
of data release models, which are forms of control that limit how data sets are used in
order to reduce risk and to prevent re-identification [11]. Many research institutions already
conduct information sharing in such ways. Garfinkel’s five examples of data release models
are described below [48].
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The Release and Forget Model
The release and forget model certainly gives no accountability to the data provider. In Ohm’s
Broken Promises of Privacy, he explains how some organizations have very little follow
through other than simply running the de-identification process and providing disclosure
[49]. Ohm also shows a data controller’s failure to address the utility factor in the data
set [49]. With the release and forget method, control of PII is completely lost to the provider
and, therefore, completely in the hands of the receiver [48].
The Data Use Agreement Model
A legal document signed between data controller and third party. Depending on the
agreement, the data controller may be able to restrict any re-identification attempts made
by the party or control further sharing of the de-identified dataset [11].
Simulated Data Verification Model
Offering a limited, simulated data set is another data release model. In this model, a data
controller provides a simulated de-identified data set, similar to the original, for disclosure
purposes only [48]. Outside researchers can run programs and query the disclosed data
set, but, for further verification, researchers can request that their tools be run by the data
controller on the original source [48]. The data controller is able to run and test the
researcher’s results against the original dataset, then release the results using SDL [48].
The Enclave Model
The enclave model requires the most from the data provider. In the enclave model, a
qualified data controller would accept requests from reputable extramural researchers, run
those requests on de-identified data sets, and report the results to the researcher, never
having to share the data set itself. [48].
Interactive Query Interface
An interactive query interface model makes a synthetic dataset releasable to the public
(or to a limited segment of the public) by using various privacy preserving methods [48].
Differential privacy may be added to datasets that retain original data, adding noise and
providing confidentiality to data subjects, or fully synthetic datasets may also be utilized
[48].
These are not technical controls but controls implemented on a operational or organizational
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level.
4.6 Impact of Data Set Selection
While researchers could simply use synthetic data sets, and sometimes do, synthetic data
sets will never exactly match real data sets. Choosing what type of data set to use is key
to the integrity of any research. Sometimes data controllers do choose synthetic data;
however, working with synthetic data sets also requires careful study and an exceptional
skill level for those disclosing their research. “Synthetic and artificial data sets pose
a challenge to researchers and the general public. A synthetic data set designed to allow
research on hospital accidents nationwidemight let researchers draw accurate, generalizable
conclusions about the impact of training and doctor’s work hours on patient outcomes, but
make it mathematically impossible to identify specific patients, doctors or hospitals. Such
a data set would be useless for the purpose of accountability or transparency” [73].
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In previous chapters, this thesis has established a baseline of understanding regarding
the complexities surrounding PII in data sets. Chapter 5 discusses how to approach risk
assessment problems, presents a taxonomy of factors to help the researcher identify methods
to mitigate risk, and elaborates on factors of both risk and impacts of harm included in the
taxonomy.
5.1 Taxonomy
Table 5.1 lists the classifications and definitions used to evaluate our privacy risk scenarios.
Regarding NPS’s RDC, a few factors to consider include: levels of access provided to the
recipient, the type of interface provided to NPS, and the type of output given to the recipient.
Table 5.1. Taxonomy of Risk Scenarios
Classification Definition
Levels of Access
Nothing/No Access NPS provides no access or sharing of RDC to non-
DOD qualified researchers
Access to Structured file for-
mats
NPS provides qualified researchers access to run vet-
ted algorithms on text-based file formats only
Access to Unstructured file
formats
NPS provides qualified researchers access to run vet-
ted algorithms on text-based file formats only
Access to Image file formats NPS provides access to run algorithms on image file
formats and text-based file formats from qualified re-
searchers
Access to Audio and Video
file formats
NPS provides access to run algorithms on all of the
above formats and audio and video file formats




Self-written code NPS produces its own code to run on RDC and
provides requested data to qualified extramural re-
searcher.
Known or Commonly Used
code
NPS utilizes known or familiar tools, either open
source or proprietary programs, to extract data re-
quested by extramural researcher
Run arbitrary code, provide
source
NPS runs code provided by qualified extramural re-
searcher and also receives source code
Run arbitrary code, binary
only
NPS runs code provided by qualified extramural re-
searcher with no source code and only binary file
Output Classification
Limited or Fixed strings The output of algorithmic data is structured and lim-
ited in scope and human readable. Predictable and
well organized, the data in structured file formats are
easier to identify andmine for data. Some examples of
structured data are lists of file-names, metadata, and
network packets in language formats like .xml, .txt,
.html, and ASCII.
Arbitrary Text Unstructured text-based data that lacks a certain level
of organization or format which makes parsing and
identifying PII indicators difficult. Examples include:
the whole contents of emails(narratives), Word and
PDF documents.
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Binary File Formats File formats where the majority of information is
stored as binary data. Binary data by itself lacks sig-
nificance and translating to produce substantive data
relies on various applications. Binary file formats
move away from human readable formats like ASCII
text. The structure of data depends largely on the algo-
rithm that produced the output and can be structured
or unstructured in nature. Examples of binary files are
compiled files like images, compressed files, media
files, and even text files [74].
5.2 Risks Associated with Data Types and Levels of Access
As stated in Section 3.4, the potential of the RDC as a research resource obligates research
institutions to protect human subjects and their personal information from harm. In order
to protect the confidentiality of RDC subjects, PI must be anonymized. Because efficacy of
de-identification depends on file formats, we classified levels of access from the requester
by file types.
No Access
Referring to Figure 5.1, giving NoAccess to a requester is the safest option to protect subject
PII. The No Access classification is currently in place, and, while it does guarantee subject
PII protection, it does nothing to provide any benefit to digital forensic research.
Structured data
Giving slightly more access, access to structured data, would not be difficult. De-
identification of PII is far more effective with predictable structured string and plain-text file
formats because tabular or categorical data is already organized and queried. Open source
tools with PII identification features use string matching algorithms to identify personal
information. Previous works by NPS faculty and known digital forensic tools like bulk-
extractor, referenced in section 2.9.3 offer some assurance that sharing RDC data without



















Figure 5.1. Illustration of Risk Increase as Requester/User is Granted In-
creasing Access to Various RDC Data.
file formats makes it easier for automated and manual checking from the data controllers
perspective and makes more effective de-identification possible.
Unstructured data
Unstructured text files like Word documents with long narratives are harder to monitor,
and, as Garfinkel stated in NIST SP 800-188, “finding such identifiers and distinguishing
them from non-identifiers invariably requires domain specific knowledge” [48]. Although
data controllers will de-identify the results produced by a specific algorithm, the ambiguity
of quasi-identifiers in the de-identification process makes unstructured text files harder to
validate. Part of the process of assessing risk is to categorize our responsibility regarding
each information type in our information system. When it comes to analyzing a database
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filled with health information, context and structure are predictable. However, a single disc
image can contain many different types of PI direct or quasi-identifiers in many different
file formats. We would need to know what the requester’s algorithm is looking for, and,
although levels of access files are not de-identified at this stage, for manual checking, human
readable formats provide less uncertainty.
Image or Audio File Formats
Image formats aremore difficult to sanitize and require different de-identification techniques
depending on what information is requested. Image file objects have more complexity
and are rich with various identifiers beyond the usual name or telephone number. Add
to that different formats which come compressed or use alternative vector graphics, and
allowing image or audio file access becomes even more murky. Some image formats
also produce metadata, which, on top of visual PII, produce other PII indicators like
geotagging or MakersNote info on Exif files. Creating an automated process to identify PII
in these unstructured formats is difficult and an endeavor which exceeds the resources of this
thesis because it would require extensive knowledge on such image formats and the binary
data produced. However, various multimedia formats, such as image files, may be made
accessible to certain requests where the requesters algorithm seeks image file metadata and
produces text-based output for easier scrubbing of PII.
Other Multimedia Formats
While image files are considered multimedia, we categorically separated images from
video because there are additional complexities which would require multi-modal de-
identification15. Adding another modality increases the number of personal identifiers.
Also, if the modality is not well understood, more personal indicators would be vulnerable
to insufficient de-identification and ultimately re-identification by possible linking between
multiple modes. Therefore, multimedia files pose a significantly higher risk to privacy of
subjects, and accessibility should be restricted.
Complete Access
Complete access produces the highest risk because the requester has unlimited access,
which would include all files, executable and system files, as well. Heterogeneity of data
15Garfinkel defines multimodal de-identification as the combination of biometric identifiers (face, finger-
print), soft biometrics (age, weight), and non-biometric identifiers (hair and dress style) [11]. The combination
of these could lead to a full identification of an individual and needs to be de-identified. [11]
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and format types overwhelm our ability to adequately find all personal identifiers or possible
factors for re-identification. Formats with different encoding and reliance on digital forensic
tools that fail to thoroughly de-identify PII pose a high risk for PII leakage or exposure.
With certain modalities, especially in the realm of multimedia, identifying personal data
requires expertise in other fields such as biometrics and information processing of such data.
Machines may also record one event in several different ways (Semantic data). Unfettered
access and testing on RDC could make piecing together or linking quasi-identifiers much
easier, jeopardizing the identity and personal information of human subjects.
5.2.1 Interface Classification
After a researcher has made a request to access the RDC and communicated clearly their
research, objectives, and data needed, the next step is to figure out the logistics of extracting
such information from the RDC. As stated in Chapter 1, to reduce the labor of having
to de-identify raw data from hard drives, the model proposed would restrict the input and
export of data while the de-identification phase would occur on the output of the accepted
input algorithm. Our thesis uses an approach that could be likened to the "enclave model,"
described in Section 4.5. However, we are not running these algorithms on a de-identified
database. Therefore, we place emphasis on vetting the input algorithms and performing a
security evaluation if a source or binary is given.
Interface classification describes a generalized list of the possible forms the analytical
method or program can take and illustrates the risks or benefits associated with a given
option.
Using Code Produced/Defined by Naval Postgraduate School
An algorithm written by the provider of information is likely the safest option. The provider
of RDC data knows exactly how their program extracts information and has ample ability
to test the program in various stages. This avoids any questions about what the program is
doing, and the provider would not have to conduct a security evaluation. While potentially
the safest option, writing a program for requesters is very time consuming and depends on
the skill set of the provider.
Utilizing Known-Code or Open Source/Commercial Software
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Another option would be to use familiar commercial software or open source programs
like EnCase, Sleuth Kit, Bulk Extractor and fiwalk. These sophisticated forensic tools
are commonly used by law enforcement and forensic examiners and are useful software
with features that would allow providers options for de-identification. Such tools save the
provider from writing their own de-identification program, and such programs have multi-
threading features that allow for faster processing. The BitCurator project paper highlights,
however, that heavy dependence on such tools does not provide sufficient de-identification
because “working with heterogeneous forms of data from many sources” requires a lot
of post processing and patchwork, where even sophisticated tools lack compatibility or
customization [57].
Open source programs, on the other hand, despite many benefits including being easily
accessible, free, transparent, and customizable, also present some vulnerabilities. Since
source code is made visible to the public, malicious users may find vulnerabilities in the
program and utilize those bugs for PII leaks. Open source tools may have not undergone
“meticulous evaluation” that commercial tools have undergone due to industry standards.
In addition, contributions made by the public on open source tools may taint the open source
distribution with malicious code. Therefore, the use of open source programs needs to be
made judiciously by the provider possibly including a security evaluation made on the open
source tool before use [75].
Arbitrary Code, with Source Code Provided
The risk of privacy exposure increases when the requester provides their own code. If the
requester is utilizing the RDC to do developmental testing on a tool, they may want not only
the data but they may also need the performance diagnostics. A security evaluation on the
program can be attempted, but this is difficult, and the risk is dependent on the complexity
of the code. In this option, the source code is provided, which we may test to ascertain
risk and determine if it falls within acceptable risk level. In these types of scenarios, there
is a risk that the requester might try and surreptitiously extract RDC PII and hide the data
through output. To avoid this, a certain level of confidence must be established through
evaluation, testing, and visibility of the program.
From Arbitrary Code, with Binary Only
The types of analytical programs that pose the highest risk to PII leaks are those provided
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in only binary file formats. Once an executable program is compiled, it very difficult to
conduct a security evaluation because the provider has no design information or visibility
on what the code is actually doing. Although reverse engineering approaches exist, there
is really no automated or expeditious shortcut that would accurately render source code
recovery. Depending on the program’s complexity, reverse engineering code (RCE) may be
an intense resource and time-consuming endeavor.
Using static or dynamic techniques only help elucidate basic control flow characteristics of a
program. The provider could perhaps use a disassembler16 or decompiler17 for source code
recovery; however, decompilers have no proof of correctness and are considered unreliable
[76]. The provider could produce a similar program, essentially reverse engineering the
binary via static analysis, utilizing hexeditors, objdumps, or even going with a hybrid
or dynamic analysis method of viewing portable executable (PE) headers or running the
program through debuggers. This process, however, would be extremely time-consuming
given the complexity of the program. Despite reverse engineering methods, even then, there
is still a risk that the analysis of the program’s behavior might have a PII leak because there
is no complete visibility.
5.2.2 Output Classification
Our data sharing model takes algorithms and allows them to run on the RDC to provide
their own output. Although a disk image is not an database, on some level, if an algorithm
produces a structured output, it makes the data controller’s de-identification job a bit easier.
This provides an advantage over other information systems that go through the process
of complete de-identification before any queries. The length and structure of output are
critical to the success of de-identification. Therefore, algorithms that produce structured
data, which is limited to a fixed set of strings or typical metadata, is the easiest to work with.
Unstructured text-based outputs, such as free form text, and even more problematic binary
file formats, reduce the confidence of de-identified results because personal identifiers
become harder to classify, match, or even find.
Structured, Categorical, Tabular Data
16machine code to assembly code
17machine language to some source code, most do not claim take output and feed into decompiler and get
same input. Signature profile compiler to create original binary, compiler options.
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Structured data can be stored in some field or record and can be easily retrievable. Structured
short data is easiest to de-identify because information types are pre-defined categorically
which makes it easier to locate PI.
Free Form Text
Text based files with little organization, usually seen with narratives, documents with
non categorized data. “Scrubbing” tools like MIST, with natural processing language
algorithms, are able to de-identify various identifiers in free form text-based files, especially
in areas of health information. In addition, bulk_extractor can identify keywords to bridge
the gap between processing unstructured data.
Binary File Formats
All data on a computer is stored in binary, 0’s and 1’s. The symbolic representation and
interpretation by an application of binary data is what renders it either human readable
or readable to some other machine or application. In order to identify PI for successful
de-identification, readability of data is a necessity.
When working with binary file formats, the risk to PII exposure is substantially reduced
if the binary format, with relative ease, can translate data to some human readable form.
However, since translation of binary data is application-specific, there are some problems
providers face when performing de-identification.
Binary compatibility where various parts of code in a file (data section) can be interpreted
the same way but other parts (i.e., file header) may have different information [74].
5.2.3 Possible Threats and Impacts
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 list different threats to consider and the potential impacts of
disclosure.
5.2.4 Data Categories
Some of the most common data types found in the health field, which can be easily applied
to our overall work on de-identifying PII, are listed by the Integrating the Health Enterprise
(IHE) information technology (IT) Infrastructure Handbook. Table 5.6 summarizes the
common data categories related to PII, discussing examples of each andmethods tomitigate.
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Table 5.2. Re-identification Scenarios. Source: [11].
Re-identification Threat Scenarios
Prosecutor scenario Attacker knows that a specific person is in thedataset and can re-identify
Journalist scenario Organizational discredit knowing there is atleast one person that can be re-identified
Marketer scenario Percentage that can be re-identified
Differential identifiability scenario Analysis performed on two sets, onecontaining an individual, and one not
Table 5.3. Potential Impact of De-identified Data. Source: [11].
Potential Impact of De-Identified data
Identity disclosures Specific data linked to a specific individual
Attribute disclosures A piece of confidential information can be attributed to a subject
Inferential disclosures Information inferred with high confidence from data statistics
Table 5.4. Adversary Skill Levels. Source: [11]
Adversary Skill Level
General Public Anyone with access to public information
Expert A computer scientist skilled in re-identification
Insider A member of the organization which produced the data
Insider Recipient A member of the organization which receives de-identified databut has access to other background information
Information Broker Gathers both de-identified and identifying data, combined into alarger set for exploit
Nosy Neighbor Friend or family member with access to specific context
Table 5.5. Privacy Risk Harms in De-identification Disclosure. Source: [11].
Privacy Risk Harms in De-Identification Disclosure
Insufficient de-identification
Re-identification by linkingIdentity disclosure
Pseudonym reversal
Attribute disclosure Confidential data release
Inferential disclosure Group harms
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Table 5.6. Data Categories, Examples, and Mitigation Approaches. Source
[12]
Data Categories Example Approach
PII direct identifiers Name, SSN, e-mail Remove where possibleAggregate
Aggregation variables Birthdates, ages, locations GeneralizationsReplace with ranges
Demographic indirect
identifiers Sex, ethnicity, occupations
Remove where possible
Aggregate
Outlier variables Medical procedures performedDistinct deformities
Assess risk and remove if
necessary
Structured data variables Vital signs, lab tests, and results Perform re-identification riskanalysis
Freeform text Physician notes, referral letters Omit PII from freeform textNatural language processing
Non-parsable voice Voice recordings Remove
Image data X-rays, scans Omit where possible
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5.3 Methodology
The methodology proposed in this Chapter is to apply the fundamentals of the RMF and
PRMF with the circumstances of the RDC and our data sharing model.
5.3.1 Categorize
The types of PI in the RDC are quite vast. Since disk images are derived from real people,
PII types are not strictly confined to one specific area. Disk images can contain financial,
medical, professional information, etc., in unstructured formats. Our model however,
precludes us from performing de-identification on the RDC drives. Instead we focus the
results of the algorithm run on the RDC and will derive potential PII information types from
the output. Either by communication with the extramural researcher or testing arbitrary
code on the RDC, each scenario will categorize and identify PII types. Ways in which we
might determine and categorize PII on scenarios.
• Determine the algorithm’s purpose?
• Howmuch access has the algorithm been granted and what files types are accessible?
• What PII types were observed, if any?
• What is the format of the algorithm’s output?
• Are there any problematic data actions?
• Manually review the output and view if structured, semi-structured or unstructured
format. Is the output in binary?
5.3.2 Controls
Once we have discovered what PII types are in our system and the categories of data that
we are working with, we select the appropriate controls to mitigate the potential risk. The
following are steps to identify what controls can be used.
• What application can successfully use to translate the data?
• What tools can we use to de-identify the algorithm data?
• What data sharing model can be used to protect PII?
• What tools can we use to attempt to re-identify algorithm data?
• What access restrictions can be applied to secure the data?
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• Use PII forensic tools like bulk_extractor or perhaps other free form text processing
tools or scrubbers.
Once controls are selected, we must implement them. Here we test the algorithms on a
small sample of the RDC to observe behavior. Anonymized results and in relation to our
taxonomy of risk scenarios, make a risk assessment before release to extramural researcher
5.3.3 Assess
In the assess step, the process identifies risks, assets, value, and harm in regards to the data
subjects and organization. Assessments start off with defining what parameters are via the
framing of objectives from our first step. We will identify threats, events, or vulnerabilities
and can then assess impact and how these factors affect the data subjects. In regards to
privacy assessment we will also identify specific risks relating to privacy of the individual.
• Assess the possible threat sources.
• Assess characteristics of the threat in regard to capability and intent.
• What factors mitigate these threats?
• Evaluate the likelihood that the threats will be initiated.
• What vulnerabilities make these threats more likely?
• What is the likelihood of a threat succeeding?
• What are the impacts of PII release?
• Assess risk, based on impact and overall likelihood using Table 5.7.
Table 5.7. Risk Assessment Scale. Source [2].
Level of ImpactLikelihood
(threat causes impact) Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Very High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Moderate Very Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Low Very Low Low Low Low Moderate
Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low
5.3.4 Authorize
Authorization, or determination to release, can be made once the controls that were imple-
mented are assessed. If appropriate controls are implemented to reduce the likelihood and
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impact of a threat event, the risk objectives of the organization are met, the organization
can make a determination to release the data.
• Did the risk assessment fall within the boundaries of the goals and objectives set by
the organization?
• Were the organizational goals met?
• Determine if the risk is acceptable.
5.3.5 Monitor
In themonitor step, evaluation is done to test if controls or responses are effective. Continual
monitoring of our system allows the researchers to make adjustments and to adapt to various
changes or include new remediation (i.e., new identifiers) into our process. It is important
to note that for future research every scenario conduct their own assessment and determine
what types of PI they have observed and dealt with or de-identified. Whether using
pseudonyms or statistical disclosure limitation, all these methods should be documented to
keep track of what has been released and modified. A well-documented system also assists
future researchers to learn from previous experiments and monitor re-identification attacks.
As the “data rich network” evolves pseudonyms become more prone to re-identification
attacks [11]. Especially in the case with pseudonyms where overtime they can be reversed.
Here we confirm that the algorithm is running on the RDC as intended. After disclosure
we will review the work of the qualified researcher, and any findings or published material
regarding our dataset to check results.
5.4 Organizational Requirements
The scope of PII problems can become unmanageable due to various data modalities
highlighted in previous sections. Therefore, we placed the following requirements on our
scenarios with requests to run on the RDC.
• Conditions of use of the RDC meets the purpose and goals of advancing the state-of-
the-art of digital forensics
• Objectives are derived from the standards of ethical conduct and research established
by the IRB. The DOD affirms these standards.
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• Organizational and research objectives state that the welfare of data subjects are a
primary concern and PI we consider above minimal risk, will not be disclosed.
• The PI data is not being used for the sole purpose of identifying data subjects
• Agree that results of algorithm and analysis will be checked for PI and go through
de-identification process.
• Due to our resources we are not able to de-identify images, audio, or video, sources
of information.
• Data sharing model implemented is a hybrid between enclave data release model and
interactive query interface model(limited to qualified researchers).
– Export of data is monitored by a data controller like that of an enclave, but
queries are run on the original RDC data set (like that of the interactive query
interface).
– The results from original data set are then reviewed and go through a process of
de-identification(depending on the modality).
– Data controller then reviews and checks de-identified data set for potential PII
leaks. If satisfied and deemed low risk, data controller will disclose to requesting
party.
Researchers looking to extract data clearly for PII and after the anonymization process find
results to be useless would not benefit from running their algorithm on the RDC nor do
our policies allow for it therefore it is with the explicit understanding that the extramural
researcher understand that all direct identifiers, in addition to some quasi-identifiers will be
sanitized.
Despite the reputation and body of work of the requesting researcher a security evaluation
on the algorithm or program being run on the RDC should be done. This is to avoid
any unintended information flows that the requesting researcher could be maliciously or
unintentionally trying to extract.
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Chapter 5 presented a sample RMF, built to be applicable to the need to de-identify PII and
researcher requests to access NPS’s RDC. Chapter 6 applies that RMF, step-by-step, to a
real world scenario.
6.1 Sifting Collector Scenario
6.1.1 Background
Jonathan Grier, a digital forensic security consultant, in collaboration with Golden Richard
III from the University of New Orleans, developed a new evidence acquisition approach
called “sifting collectors.” Sifting collectors attempt to address the “volume challenge”18 by
hybridizing disk imaging and live memory acquisition methods with the goal of extracting
only relevant data. Thus, sifting collectors can recognize and identify relevant regions
of the disk and image only those regions without losing important artifacts or risking PII
disclosure from other areas of the disk [77].
After reviewing Grier’s paper on sifting collectors and correspondence, NPS RDC re-
searchers were able to determine his motivations for RDC access. Because the sifting
collector relies on identifying relevant regions of memory and performs selective acquisi-
tion, researchers understood that the RDC’s data could provide a wealth of information in
helping Grier identify such regions, improving the tool’s accuracy and efficacy on many
real world drives. Based on the core requirements described in Chapter 6, researchers
understood that PII was not one of their research goals, and they had no reservations about
the de-identification of PI. Grier was also willing to provide their source code and addi-
tional assistance in helping to test their program on the RDC, so researchers determined
that Grier and Richards were qualified requesters and that their research would benefit the
digital forensic field. The researchers had completed their assessment.
18Coined by Doug Laney, the volume challenge attempts to address one of the four Vs that characterize big
data; the Vs are described in Section 2.2.
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6.1.2 Methodology
The following steps were taken to analyze risk:
• Identify level of access classification needed as complete access
• Classify sifting collector as arbitrary code with source code provided
• Assess algorithm bymanually testing on small set of simulated data. Perform security
evaluation on input algorithm while concurrently observing the characteristics of the
output.
• Use bulk-extractor to extract any potential PII on results. None were found.
• Observe and classify output data and identifiers, determine grain-set file as binary
and log files as unstructured text file. No direct identifiers relating to human data
subjects presented. Quasi-identifiers were potentially indicated, specifically, path
names of disk images that identified the country of origin from which the disk drive
was purchased.
• Apply algorithm throughout the data corpus using multiprocessing script, then review
output created.
• Run bulk_extractor again on all scanners to identify any potential PII. None were
found.
• Manually sample and review results for potential PII exposure. If found, document
and categorize that identifier. Try to adjust bulk_extractor scanner or script to account
for that information type. None were found in this scenario.
• Researcher was not given actual disk images, only diagnostic and grain-set files.
The researcher was interested in file system profiles, in order to apply the RDC to
compare probabilistic areas of memory that might have forensic relevance. The
output, however, was not a disk image but a grain-set, information about the structure
of the disk image. As actual data was not transferred to the researcher, privacy was
fully maintained.
6.1.3 Testing and Output
Researchers utilized the sifting collector’s evaluation mode, since the RDC is a organized
collection of preexisting E01 raw images. The sifting collector was initially run on simulated
data found in the RDC. After reviewing the results, researchers then moved forward with
running the program in bulk using a python script and its multiprocessing module. A
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• diagnostic log file
The program then compressed three of the outputs, leaving out the sifted images naming
convention *-diagnostic.zip. Due to storage constraints of the RDC, our script incorporated
the deletion of sifted images but retained all files in the zip file.
6.1.4 De-Identification measures
After the initial and full run of Grier’s sifting collector on the RDC’s 3,098 disk images,
researchers received 1,319 results from the algorithm. Each disk image on the RDC has a
corresponding cryptographicmd5 ID hashes, which is a digital fingerprint of the disk image.
Out of the 1,319 results, researchers could only locate 909 of these hashes, perhaps due
to errors during disk imaging process. After reviewing diagnostic logs, researchers came
to the determination to mask the path names to RDC images. This was done, primarily,
to prevent extramural researchers from knowing the layout of our file system and, also to
remove the country of origin which is located in the path name. The choice of transforming
abbreviations for the country names using hashes is a form of pseudonymization which
preserves the relationship for later use by the data controller, but leaves the system open
for future re-identification. After running the results on bulk_extractor to check for any
attributes or PII, researchers then proceeded to extract all the path names and placed them
into a file. After retrieving 909 md5 hashes, researchers then wrote a script to write over
the pathname in Grier’s diagnostic.log files.
6.1.5 Analysis
After receiving and installing the sifting collector, using an unprivileged account, re-
searchers ran the program in evaluation mode19 on a Non-U.S. (NUS) directory of the RDC
using server @domex.nps.edu on Linux.
19evaluation mode on Grier’s program ran on disk images
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It is worthmentioning that Grier’s sifting collector currently only works on NewTechnology
File System (NTFS)20 file formats. Thus, the sifting collector did not collect disk image
information on those that have been reformatted, damaged, or tampered with on a disk level
to hide data.
Researchers also observed, while working on this scenario, that performing a security
evaluation on proprietary source codewas laborious. Although trying to avoid PII disclosure
through an exploit or vulnerability in his program, this process of evaluating code would
not be feasible within the de-identification model, and researchers questioned if the model
would take any arbitrary algorithms.
The diagnostic log file tracks the programs status during the processing of an image. The
contents tracks the grains and size of the disk in addition to the date and time the process
ran on the RDC. Other information includes number of partitions, file system format of
those partitions, unallocated or allocated regions, number of nodes within the file system,
and the percentage and time the sifting collector took to process the image. What was
concerning, however, was that the log file captured the path and names of the images, which
both divulges the disk image’s country of origin and reveals the layout of the RDC database.
Although country location alone is not considered a sensitive personal identifier it would
take minimal effort to anonymize such data, and anonymization would reduce the possibility
of re-identification via quasi-identifiers and linking of database information through results
and analysis of other research results.
Since the objective of the sifting collector is to run on disk images and analyze, sector by
sector, what areas were forensically relevant and then copy those regions, researchers allow
Grier’s tool to access all types of data which is a flag for a high risk classifier. However,
the sifting collector is not interested in the content of the data but rather its relevance and
potential as evidence. As Grier explains in his request, they seek “grains containing any
data associated with forensically relevant file... or at least one forensically relevant disk
sector” [77]. If a sector is imaged, then a 1 is written as output for that sector in a grain-set
(GST) file, 0 if not copied. This is a low level abstraction that provides no file content
information.
20NTFS developed by Microsoft as a high performance file system built on top of the FAT file system with
more permission features, journaling, and uses a special file called a Master File Table that handles metadata
and allocates spaces for files more efficiently [78]
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The *.gst files produced are grain-set files, which are binary representations of what the
sifting collector copied. The grain-set file produced a binary output which makes it hard for
human readability and manual processing of data. Because binary formats are considered
high risk in output classification, we would have to perform a thorough analysis of the
source code.
6.2 Determination for Disclosure
To determine risk of disclosure for this scenario, we will consider the likelihood of a threat
event based on the relevant threats and RDC vulnerabilities, and how they relate to the
impact or harm of an data subject if the output was released. The risk assessment table
developed by NIST, shown in Table 5.7, is used to determine risk as a function of likelihood
and impact.
6.2.1 Likelihood
Threats and vulnerabilities affect how likely a threat event is to occur. We noted the
following attributes from the scenario, which we then assessed to see if each would increase
or decrease the likelihood of the threat event’s occurrence.
• High adversary skill: Increase
• Trusted adversary reputation: Decrease
• Full access to disk image : Increase
• No availability of external data links: Decrease
• Algorithm source code known: Increase
• De-identification by pseudonymization: Decreases
• Unstructured text output: Increase
• Re-identification: Decrease
Taking all the threats and vulnerabilities into account, we assess that the likelihood of data
compromise is very low. The most dominant factor is that the actual adversary in this case
is a trusted agent (extramural researcher).
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Table 6.1. Scenario Risk Assessment. Source [2].
Level of ImpactLikelihood
(threat causes impact) Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Very High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Moderate Very Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Low Very Low Low Low Low Moderate
Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low
6.2.2 Impact
As discussed earlier, the only identifying information that could be released is the country
of origin. As a quasi-identifier, the impact is assessed as low. It would take more than just
this one attribute to identify an individual.
6.2.3 Risk Determination
After assessing the likelihood that the threat event would occur as unlikely and that the
impact of the release of the data would be low, we assessed an overall risk of very low as




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
The goal of this research was to share the RDC while maintaining privacy of data subjects
while also providing the maximum availability of useful data.
This thesis discussed a method of risk assessment as applied to scenarios that contain PII.
We highlighted the definitions, legal and ethical concerns, and technical aspects of allowing
extramural researchers access to the RDC. A taxonomy and methodology for approaching
this issue was developed and we were able to answer the following questions.
What are the risks, and what is considered acceptable risk of disclosure? Risks were
evaluated based on the probability of the threat and the impact of disclosure. Various
threats were outlined in Chapter 5 as well as different impacts. Each scenario will be
different, but the methodology in Chapter 5 can be used by NPS again to evaluate what level
of risk is involved when working with extramural researchers.
How can we allow extramural researchers access to the RDC and institutions without
significant risk to human subject privacy? We are able to do this by implementing various
de-identification tools and security control measures. After assessing the threat likelihoods
and impact, we identified the scenario as low risk. Our background research revealed that
HIPAA’s Safe Harbor de-identification standard was the best current method for removing
PI, direct and quasi-identifiers, from our results. Although we did not find any PI identifiers
eighteen Safe Harbor identifiers, we saw fit to remove the abbreviated country names on
the RDC pathnames. Masking of pathnames would not reduce the utility of the data set but
obscured a potential link between the data set and human data subject.
Due to the heterogeneity of data, can we effectively build a criteria for algorithms and how
restrictive must the criteria be to protect human subject confidentiality? We developed a set
of restrictions to bound the problem so that our methodology could be applied effectively.
The restrictions placed on extramural researchers included the following.
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• Working inside IRB guidelines, which was achieving minimal risk
• PII not used solely to identify individuals
• Agree that algorithms will be checked and vetted.
• Only text-based outputs could be used
• Requests be fulfilled using our hybrid data sharing mode.
Can we successfully de-identify PII output generated by vetted algorithms provided by
external researchers and safely disclose the results? Tools such as bulk_extractor and our
own scripts allowed us to verify that there was no PII in the output that was provided to the
extramural researchers. As the country of origin could be gleaned from the path names, it
was a relatively easy task to develop a script to hide the country names.
At what point do results lose their utility when too much PII is removed? We discussed in
this thesis that different levels of access can severely hinder the objectives of the research.
We also saw that aggressive de-identification could alter the data too much and lead to less
accurate results. A dialogue must be established by NPS and extramural researchers to
assess on a case by case basis, the level of access and de-identification required. Also NPS
should also adopt a DUA along with continued monitoring with IRB to prevent third parties
from re-identification and save procedures to control data release.
We can improve on future research by establishing a procedure for continuous monitoring
and logging of the PII encountered in various scenarios and how that PII was processed.
We discussed that keeping a record of this allows future researchers to go back into previous
work and improve on what had been done.
7.2 Future Work
The framework forms the basis for future work in de-identification and data release pro-
cedures. When first investigating de-identification our goal was to find scenarios and use
digital forensic tools to try and automate a de-identification process. After our first scenario
and researching into another request, we found that de-identification was a problem with
a huge scope, which not only had mathematical complexities but dealt with the legal and
ethical issues of privacy, which is hard to define in itself. With the task of de-identification
of human data subjects, it is required to understand the mechanisms, standards, and proce-
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dures to release de-identified information responsibly. However, further work needs to be
done to understand how PI is being used.
A natural follow on to our project would be to: Build a synthetic dataset of the RDC and use
the Synthetic Validation Model to help extramural researchers develop and perfect tools,
then offer SDL results with tests run on the original data set, for validation.
Much of our restrictions were confined to text-based structured and unstructured files. As
one of our restrictions was to use text based files, we must look into other types of media
and develop tools to identify PII on images, video, and other mixed media. More tools need
to be developed and identified so we can add biometric identifiers to our study.
After creating synthetic or de-identified datasets, we may want to develop a more thorough
understanding of re-identificationmethods to better evaluate the threat likelihood. Exploring
re-identification attacks can help researchers better protect datasets. Once thesemethods are
known, we should attempt to apply these re-identification techniques on algorithm outputs
before disclosure.
When working with unstructured data sets, language processing must be incorporated into
tools to account for free text. Better identification of information types in free file formats
will help reduce unintentional leaks in addition to threats posed by an adversary.
On a grander scale, privacy preserving models for information systems is something cy-
bersecurity professionals should be looking into. Cybersecurity is not always individual
privacy security but the study of protecting information will benefit all in the security field.
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APPENDIX: Other Definitions and Terminology
A.1 NIST Risk Management Framework
An organization wide security program which focuses on management of organizational
risk - risks involving the organization and all individuals within and apart the information
system. Risk Management Framework takes a risk-based approach when deciding on secu-
rity controls and configurations in addition to achieving effective and efficient system while
still abiding by laws, ordinances, directives, policies and regulations. Risk Management
Framework is a step process that incorporates multiple documents. Below are the six steps
and the corresponding publications that address development.
• Step 1:Categorize
– Deals with information systems, the process, storage and transmission of data
determined by impact analysis.
– Refers to FIPS 199 as guidelines for legislative, policy, directive, regulation,
standards and organizational directions and the identification of their security
requirements.
• Step 2: Select
– Focuses in baseline security controls and categorizes security control baseline
using possible risk assessments that the organization has made in reference to
their specific conditions.
– Refers to NIST SP 800-53
• Step 3: Implement
– How to execute implementation of security controls and how to make record
of security and how they are used within the organizational information system
and environment.
• Step 4: Assess
– Determine if security controls implemented have been done so as planned, that
they are working correctly, and they are fulfilling their purpose and meeting
security requirements.
– NIST SP 800-53A Security Control Assessment Procedures
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• Step 5: Authorize
– Information system operations are chosen on the basis of determination of risk
and takes into account the organizations assets, individuals, other organizations,
and the country and determining if choices are of acceptable risk.
– NIST SP 800-37 Revision 1 provides guidelines on the authorizations of opera-
tional information systems.
• Step 6: Monitor
– Assess selected security controls and information system in an ongoing nature
to check for effectiveness, and documenting if changes are needed. Also con-
ducting a security impact analysis on any changes made and reporting the state
of security.
– NIST SP 800-37 Revision 1 gives monitoring procedures based on security
controls and environment. Also helps determine ongoing risk determinations
and help approve authorization to operational status.
A.2 NIST Special Publications and Document Summaries
A.2.1 NIST SP 800-53: Security Privacy Controls for Federal Infor-
mation System and Organization
A.2.2 NIST SP 800-37: Applying the Risk Management Framework
to Federal Information Systems
A.2.3 NIST SP 800-39: Managing Information Security Risk
A.2.4 NIST SP 800-30R1: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessment
A.2.5 NIST SP 800-100: Information Security Handbook a Guide for
Managers
A.2.6 NIST SP 800-53: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations
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FISMA Definition FIPs 199 Definition
Confidentiality “Preserving authorized restric-
tions on information access and
disclosure, including means for
protecting personal privacy and
proprietary information. . . ”
A loss of confidentiality is the
unauthorized disclosure of infor-
mation.
Integrity “Guarding against improper in-
formation modification or de-
struction, and includes ensuring
information non-repudiation and
authenticity. . . ”
A loss of integrity is the unau-
thorized modification or de-
struction of information.
Availability “Ensuring timely and reliable
access to and use of informa-
tion. . . ”
A loss of availability is the dis-
ruption of access to or use of
information or an information
system.
A.3 Examples of Frameworks, Methodology, and Assess-
ments
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Figure A.1. Strategic Risk Chart of Risk Management and Assessment as
Applied throughout the Tiers of an Organization. Source: [5].
Figure A.2. NIST Risk Management Framework Security Life Cycle Illustrat-
ing Six Steps for Risk Management and the NIST SP and Federal Documents
that Provide Guidelines. Source: [5].
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Figure A.3. NIST Risk Assessment Methodology from Risk Management to
Risk Assessment Four Steps. Source: [2].
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Table A.2. NIST Example of Threat Taxonomy. Source: [2].
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Table A.3. NIST Example of Threat Assessment Scale. Source: [2].
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